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The International Commission on Nobility and Royalty
The promotion of the ideals of true nobility, royalty and chivalry.
PLUS:
The authentification of honors that are genuine and true.
Those who are counterfeit or imposters cannot be certified as authentic, because all claims must be based on solid, hard evidence that can be verified and confirmed as real and above board.
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SOVEREIGNTY: Questions and Answers  
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Introduction
" . . . Sovereignty is the immediate jewel of a nation. . . . [It is not only] the great vital right of a state [, it is its glory and independence --- the most precious thing it has]." (Elihu Burritt, Thoughts and Notes at Home and Abroad, 1868, p. 266) " Westphalia [the beginning of a codification of the greatest secular right on earth] remains the most significant revolution in sovereignty to date." (Danield Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty, 2002, p. 32) Since 1648, Westphalia or absolute sovereignty of states has spread to all the world. " Westphalia [is] a benchmark, a standard. . . ." (Ibid.) " Sovereignty is one of the foremost [most important] institutions of our world: it virtually defines the modern era and sets it apart from previous eras" (Robert Jackson, Sovereignty at the Millennium, 1999, p. 9) " It is part of the very 'grammar' of modern politics." (op.cit.) As A. P. dEnteves put it, " The importance [or greatness] of the doctrince of sovereignty can hardly be overrated."  ( National Law, 1970, p. 67) It is the " cournerstone" of interntional law. " The principle essentially maintains . . . [that] there is one supreme authority, the sovereign, who exercises political power that is perpetual, inalienable, indivisible, and absolute over all members of that community [nation, principality or kingdom]." Luc B. Tremblay, The Rule of Law, Justice, and Interpretation, 1997, p. 199)
Hardly anything can match it. It is so important and crucial, because it is the bedrock principle of all true monarchy, nobility, royalty and chivalry; and since some people have made objections about this right, these questions and challenges need to be addressed one by one --- not by repeating the vast amount of evidence and proof already supplied in the long and detailed article Sovereignty & The Future of Nobility and Royalty and the article " Dynastic Law," but to answer questions and hopefully provide some new and additional evidence and points worth bringing up. After all, the future of nobility, royalty and chivalry is in the balance, so much of what we consider important is at stake.
Before we start, two terms, that will be used over and over again, must be defined:
1. " De jure" means " legal," " legitimate," " by right," " lawful," " as a matter of law" " constitutional" or " in principle," but not in practice, " just," " rightful," " morally and ethically right," " rightful entitlement or claim." 
2. "Defacto" means existing "in fact," "actually," "in reality," "in power," "in practice," "operating," but not necessarily legally, rightfully or legitimately.
" A de jure government is the legal, legitimate government of a state. . . . A de facto government is in actual possession of authority and in control of the state." ( www.answers.com/topic/de-jure) A " defacto" government can also be one which has seized power by force or in any other illegal manner and governs in spite of the existence of a " de jure" or rightful government. This is the situation that we will be addressing and discussing in the following. The monarch has been robbed and plundered of his right to rule. His rights, and those of his successors, have been violated and wronged by an the unlawful act of theft whether by referendum, conquest or coup. The following shows that these deposed monarchs, and their successors and heirs, are still lawful, rightful and legitimate if they maintain these rights.
Sovereignty is the cournerstone, the rock hard foundation stone of civilized society. No wonder, ". . . the inviolability of national sovereignty [is] enshrined in the UN Charter. . . ." (C. L. Lim, " The Uses of Pacific Settlement Techniques in Malaysia-Singapore Relations:" www.mjil.law.unimelb.edu.au/issues/archive/2005(2)/04Lim.pdf) For example, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 " . . . reaffirms the principle of inviolability of the national sovereignty of States." (Claude Pilloud, Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmermann, Commentary on the additional protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Convnetions of 12 August 1949, 1987, p. 1362) These international agreements did not refer to borders only, but the preservation of rights. Hence, " . . . The argument of the sacredness and inviolability of national sovereignty . . . was heard over and over again [in the Protocols]." (Frits Kalshoven, Reflections on the Law of War: Collected Essays, 2007, p. 286) These treaties have never been invalidated. They are still in force. Inviolable means incapable of being tampered with . . . transgressed or dishonored, violated or infringed [upon]. ( http://word
netweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=inviolable) It is inalienable. It doesn't matter if the world recognizes the usurper as a sovereign government, the rightful, genuine and authentic sovereignty of a king, sovereign prince or government-in-exile remains intact. It cannot be destroyed unless the deposed king or sovereign prince willingly, and without duress, renounces, cedes, acquiescences or gives up his royal rights. In other words, if the " de jure" sovereign, and his successors, continue to use their titles, they are safe and retain the full honor and glory of their former kingdoms on a never ending basis. This will be explained below. But the point is, because " inviolability" is defined as " invincible" and " indestructible," which means it cannot be defeated or overcome without consent, then, " The principle of the inviolability of sovereignty means that the occupying power may obtain de facto sovereignty, but the ousted sovereign [the deposed monarch] retains it de jure;" and he retains it forever as long as he or his heirs never give up, but maintain their rights throughout their generations forever. (Karen Guttieri, " Making Might Right: The Legitimization of Occupation," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17, 2004: www.allacademic.com/meta/p73837_index.html) 
If you have a questions, or any comments, to make on sovereignty, or on anything else on this page, please use the e-mail contact form below and let us know. Our articles have been greatly strengthened, improved and enlarged, because of the useful feedback we have received including two notable international law experts.
Click on the question or statement that interests you:
Questions and Answers
(1) There is a legal impasse that puts on hold all claims until a competent court is established to judge all claims.
It is true that no court, in the here and now, is likely to ever take on a "de jure" monarchy case. So many modern laws, conventions and courts, etc. are completely irrelevant or inapplicable when it comes to de jure claims. In addition, there is a powerful bias against former monarch's rights to the throne, which is extremely formidable and acts as a gigantic deterrent. So what is left? --- international law and philosophy, which is a mixture of the words of scholars, jurists, treaties, court decisions and relevant historical practices. The past, where monarchs ruled and dominated practically all countries, is fertile ground for the principles that are most suited to enlighten us on what is authentic and genuine. Modern conventions still support these same principles of fairness and justice. Hence, they provide us with modern day tools to enlarge our capacity to intelligent informed decisions.
We are, as explained on our " Home Page," a private, non-government organization that functions to promote the ideals of constitutional monarchy, nobility, royalty and chivalry. We act in  the capacity similar to an accrediting association. Just as an educational accrediting association would not accredit a " diploma mill," we will not certify as authentic something that is merely fantasy or make believe, nor do we give credibility to unproven or unprovable claims, or anything else not based on correct principles.
(2) The public thinks you are basing everything you do on solid legal ground when you are really basing your decisions on legal philosophy. The sayings of the ancients are not immutable or enforceable.
Very good observation. We have built our judgments and standards on the systems of law  created when monarchy and nobility ruled the earth. They are from ancient times, but were more particularly articulated in the 14 th to the 19 th centuries. But the rules we use regarding sovereignty have been incorporated into modern international law.
Still the principles of justice and law in regard to "de jure" monarchs, or their successors, are not enforceable, because international courts do not allow such cases to be tried. Only nation-states can participate in the International Court of Justice or Tribunals. Therefore, all we can do is give our opinions based upon the standards of known principles of what is just and lawfully right. The fact is that some of the most important principles we espouse, although recognized in international law, are recognized only in breach or in an inactive or dormant manner. That is, few "de jure" governments, such as, a legitimate government-in-exile or monarch are officially recognized. Nevertheless, in effect, the laws are still on the books. For example, it is recognized in international law that a government-in-exile has the following powers:
. . . undertake many types of actions in the conduct of their daily affairs. These actions include:
becoming a party to a bilateral or international treaty
amending or revising its own constitution
maintaining military forces
retaining (or "newly obtaining") diplomatic recognition by sovereign states
issuing identity cards
allowing the formation of new political parties
instituting democratic reforms
holding elections
(www.absoluteastronomy.com
/topics/Government_in_exile)
Yet, no nation on earth will recognize or validate as " de jure" and rightful any of them, even though some of these organizations, like the exiled government of the Dalai Lama of Tibet, has great social respect as well as political clout and influence. Nor will the world officially respect or acknowledge the authentic and genuine rights of deposed monarchs and their rightful successors. The problem is, " . . . who is sovereign, de jure or defacto, of a territory is not a judicial, but a political question, the determination of which is by the legislative and executive departments. . . ." (Anthony J. Colangelo, " De facto Sovereignty: Boumediene and Beyond," The George Washington Law Review, vol. 77, no. 623, April 2009, p. 638) Being a political question, what is ethical is rarely considered, but what is popular at the time is what is important when it comes to politics.  That is, recognition becomes a matter of whim or expediency. It is not usually a matter of what is right, just or fair. The rule of law is thus subverted and contaminated by the capriciousness and notoriously corrupt decisions of politicians. For example, President Richard Nixon for political reasons granted Chairman Mao and Red China " de jure" recognition or legitimization even though this wretched man killed or slaughtered 80,000,000 people to get control of this ancient land and its people. You can't get much worse. Yet, in spite of what political decisions are made, " . . . permanent allegiance is owed only to a 'de jure' sovereign." (Hersch Lauterpacht, editor, International Law Reports, 1954, p. 84) Why? --- because we owe allegiance only to what is just and true. What is meant by " de jure" in a broad legal sense is " by right," " fitting," " fair," " legitimate," " authentic," " real," " genuine," " lawful" and " true." " De jure sovereignty . . . [is the] time-tested yardstick of international law [and it] should be applied in determining the status of a geographical area and its inhabitants." (Ibid.) But sadly this is not the way it is being done. Hence, when politics determines that a nation is " de jure," then a political " de jure" right is established, but on the other hand, international law principles recognize a real " de jure" sovereign --- a government-in-exile and/or deposed and rightful king whose rights were violated by usurpation. In other words, there is a contradiction. We have politics dominating or running rough shawed over the rule of law.
 As a result of a lack of enforcement of what is fair and just and right, a newer definition of " de jure" sovereignty uses the word " opinion." For example, it is now that, A de jure government [or monarch] is one which, in the opinion of the one using the phrase, ought to possess the powers of sovereignty, though at the time it may be deprived of them." (Herbert W. Briggs, De Facto and De Jure Recognition: The Arantzazu Mendi, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 33, no. 4, October 1939, p. 689) Yet, this concept of " de jure" sovereignty is extremely important. The key principle thereof is fundamental, or at the very heart of the lawful right to bear legitimate royal titles and give out regal honors and awards --- from authentic dynastic orders of chivalry, etc. That is, the only way that such can have any meaning legally is because the giver is a true fountain of honor. Without " de jure" sovereignty, no claimant's cause is valid, worthwhile or genuine. So even though this critical concept is dormant, it is lawful and represents recognized equity and justice. Professor Stephen Kerr explained:
. . . de jure Sovereignty represents the moral principle that "might does not make right," it is [therefore] entitled to [full] recognition by other sovereigns [and all nations and all people] adhering to the moral [and ethical] principles implicit in International Law. ("King and Constitution in International Law," The Augustan, 18:4, 1977, p. 126: see: www.augustansociety.org/products/r28)
However, like most rules [or glorious standards] this [one] is usually observed in its breach [that is, in an unrealized form, such as, a broken promise] . . . in modern law. It is nevertheless, recognized as the Ideal [or what is both morally and ethically right]. (Ibid., p. 125)
For example, a man may violate your right to your property by taking it away from you, but your right to that property has not been alienated [you still hold the right], i.e., you are in the right and the robber is in the wrong." ( www.capitalism.org/faq/rights.htm)
A right is something to which one has a just claim. It is the legal or moral entitlement that belongs to a person by law, nature, or tradition. They are moral, proper and just whether they are respected or not. In one article, a new term has been applied to such inequities as a reminder of what is fair and just. It is called " de recto sovereignty" meaning " sovereignty by moral principle or right." (Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, " Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty" 2004: www.hks.harvard.edu/hpaied/docs/JOPNA-Kalt_Singer.pdf) The International Commission on Nobility and Royalty will uphold what is morally and ethically right and still lawful, even if the laws have been put on the self by modern practices or are now dormant.  After all, a " right" is by definition, " A just claim, either moral or legal, upon a society. (A Team of Experts, Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Political Science, 2000, p. 253) And this is a just and ethical claim important to society.
The "de jure" rights of sovereigns are only inactive, because it is not "politically correct" to right the wrongs perpetrated against deposed monarchs, who have had their rights stolen from them. This bias has been active for over a hundred years. We, however, as an organization, will uphold the ideals and truths about deposed monarchs. In addition, certain international legal principles, still supports and protects royal rights as supreme, legitimate and rightful above all others. What is just, right and true cannot be destroyed if the rules of justice are followed.
(3) What laws are in "breach" that violate the principles of justice or the cause of "de jure" sovereignty?
This answer below is divided into two parts. The first one is negative and erroneous, but redeemed by virtue of the principles of justice, and because what is right is "implicit in International Law." (op.cit. Stephen Kerr) The second part is positive and accurate, because the same practices provide no justification to reject the principles of justice, but every reason to fortify them and sustain them as sacred and beautifully efficacious to preserve "de jure" sovereignty's exclusive and legitimate right to govern and rule what is rightfully theirs.
First, it needs to be remembered that, " international law . . . is a complex blend of what is done and what ought to be done." (Payson S. Wild, " What is the Trouble with International Law," The American Political Science Review, vol. 32, no. 3, June 1939, p. 492) The following approaches reflects that complexity and unsettledness. It must always be remembered that international law is very political and therefore unstable.
One of the major problems for deposed monarchy is with " recognition." Nation-states now, for the most part, recognize whoever is in control of a country no matter whether it is right or wrong. Yet, as Dr. Ernst Wolff, wrote, ". . . The doctrine of non-recognition [of illegitimate governments] is a recognised principle of the law of nations. The government though ousted from its territory remains, according to that doctrine, the legitimate and the only legitimate government of the invaded country." (" The International Position of Dispossessed Governments at Present in England," The Modern Law Review, vol. 6, no. 4,  December 1943, p. 213) This doctrine or practice is so important he used the word " integral," in his first sentence, " Under the doctrine of non-recognition which, although controversial in some of its aspects, is an integral part of modem international law, belligerent occupation does not affect the sovereignty of the occupied [deposed] state. (Ibid, p. 208) Nevertheless, countries now pay little or no attention to whether a regime is legitimate, nor do they consider the validity of the claims of ousted governments or monarchs. This injustice is being bypassed and ignored. The result is " de jure" and lawful governments-in-exile and " de jure" kings and sovereign princes, who have been robbed of their lawful rights are forgotten; and justice, one of the greatest principles known to mankind, is violated or left in " breach." This is reprehensible, but it is being done.
Many countries side-step these responsibilities to properly label "de jure" those who are lawful governments from those who are "defacto" by using the 1930 Estrada doctrine or something very similar. They do this:
. . . because many States view it as politically difficult to announce publicly, one way or another, whether they "recognise" a new government, and would prefer simply to open diplomatic channels or otherwise develop relations with the new government without issuing a pronouncement that could be construed as approval of the new government. (Sean D. Murphy, " Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments," The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 48, no. 3, July 1999, p. 567) 
There's usually two reasons for doing anything. The one that sounds good and then the real reason. Nation-states often choose what will promote their economic development above the principles of justice or equity and give the good sounding justification that they are promoting international peace and stability, when the real reason is the worship of the almighty dollar. Hence, the higher values are discredited, marginalized and ignored. It is understandable, but morally objectionable.
As a result, ". . . the government de facto is one which is actually in possession of power [and is recognized] while a government de jure is one which ought (apparently in law) to possess it [is denied]. (Ibid., p. 10) Thus, those who "ought" to be recognized are flushed down the sewer, denigrated, discarded and thrown away, and the great ideals of all time and eternity are swept under the rug as refuse. However, there are problems with the above interpretation as is stated by The House of Lords in 1980. It was declared there that, "The question of the legal effects of recognition has given rise to a bitter theoretical quarrel." (House of Lords Debates, Vol. 408,
The above negative outlook on rightful sovereignty does not account for the fact that recognition is not a codified duty, nor an exact science. There are no regulations or guidelines to make it clear what each should do. Every practice is left or allowed to be open and flexible; such that, " . . . Recognition [has become merely]. . . expressing an opinion on the legal status of an entity . . . [recognition] is a purely political act. . . ." (" Recognition Of States and Governments in International Law," (Stefan Talmon, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy --- Biweekly, vol. I, no. 19, November 1, 2008) That is, ". . . States often chose to recognise the usurper on purely political considerations. Such 'political reasons' do not, of course, nullify the traditional doctrine stated by Philip Marshall Brown, Vattel, and other traditional publicists: "Might" still does not make 'right'." (Dr. Stephen Kerr, letter of 1/21/10) What is right is what is just. The point being that, [True] Legitimate authority is primarily a moral not a legal concept. . . . ( Ethics in International Affairs: Theories and Cases, 2000, p. 87) Political or self-serving decisions are not usually in the best interests of society or the world. Hence, it is recognized that, Legally, State recognition can be neither declaratory, nor translative, of a . . . title [to soverignty]. (Palestine and International Law: the Legal Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1973, p. 94) In other words, The recognition of a . . . state cannot affect the title [of another state]. . . ." (University of Manchester, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 44) If a consideral number of others states likewise recognized title, the effect is still questionable, but may " form an ingredient of a process of consolidation." (Ibid.) But this impacts external sovereignty only --- not the most important part of sovereignty.
Thus, recognition is vexed and confusing in the world chiefly because of self-serving politicians. The rule of precise law does not prevail. For example, the International Law Commission states that, ". . . A listing of acts that result in recognition does not exist." (Sixth Report on unilateral acts of States, International Law Commission Fifty-fifth Session, No. 25, May 2003, p. 8) The only uniform practice is to generally recognize countries neutrally without judgment or opinion. But this in itself leads to an entirely new way to look at what is going on, which is much more positive in terms of justice, which is quite refreshing and makes a lot more sense. That is, since countries are not really recognizing each other as legitimate or legal nor judging each other as "defacto" or "de jure," right or wrong, then whether they are actually "defacto" or "de jure" is being left open, unsettled, unanswered and inconclusive. For example:
. . . Except for a few special cases arising under exceptional cases . . . , the United States has consistently followed in its foreign relations, from the time of Thomas Jefferson, the policy of granting recognition to new governments on the defacto principle, in distinction from the theory of legitimacy. . . . The Jeffersonian policy is now observed by the United States in its foreign relations with all governments. . . . (Chandler P. Anderson, " Our Policy of Non-Recognition in Central America," The American Journal of International Law, vol. 25, no. 2, April 1931, p. 298)
Except for a few experiements over a brief period, including the use of the terms de jure and defacto, recognition has been mostly neutral, because presently, " The only criterion in international law for the recognition of an authority as the government of a State is its exercise of effective control over the State's territory." (op.cit., Stefan Talmon, 2008) Andrew Valls explains, What appears to have happened is that the moral concept of right authority [de jure] has been replaced by the conception of compétence de guerre [defacto or real possession of the territory]. . . . (op.cit., Andrew Valls) In other words, " The word de jure adds nothing in practice to recognition itself, except as a courtesy. . . ." (Herbert W. Briggs, " De Facto and De Jure Recognition: The Arantzazu Mendi," The American Journal International Law, vol. 33, no. 4, October 1939, p. 691) So no one needs to use these terms anymore in recognition, because they are meaningless. Part of the reason for this is that: 
The European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and the International Court of Justice, along with INGOs, IGOs, and NGOs, are emblematic of the development of institutions that increasingly alter the terms and conditions of dejure and de facto sovereignty. (Patrick S. O'Donnell, "Sovereignty Past & Present," 2004: www.ihrr.net/download-document/261-sovereignty_past__present?mode=view)
Hence, "There has . . . been an inexcusable confusion in the use of the terms defacto and de jure recognition, and defacto and de jure governments." (Philip Marshall Brown, "The Recognition of New States and New Governments," The American Journal of International Law, vol. 30, no. 4, October 1936, p. 690)
The failure to understand the distinction between the defacto recognition of a new state or government and de jure recognition, has been in part caused by a careless use of term. "The subject has been unduly complicated," writes Borchard, "by the chameleonic use of the term defacto, which has been applied promiscuously to de facto authorities in the field, to governments not established by constitutional means, as an adjective to qualify recognition. . . . By recognizing a government as defacto merely [or only], no judgment is being passed on the lawfulness [legitimacy or rightfulness] of that government. (op.cit., Herbert W. Briggs, p. 689)
 Sadly, " Lack of definition is common in international law. . . ." Turki Althunayan, Dealing with the Fragmented International Legal Environment, 2010, p. 98) " De jure" sovereignty is one of the problems.
In the Arantzazu Mendi we find Slesser, L. J., for the Court of Appeal, quoting Bankes, L. J., in Luther vs. Sagor, who quoted Wheaten, who quoted Montague Bernard that "A de jure government [or monarch] is one which, in the opinion of the one using the phrase, ought to possess the powers of sovereignty, though at the time it may be deprived of them. (Ibid.)
The terms de facto and dejure are applicable to governments in a purely relative sense. That is to say, which of the two is properly descriptive of a given political organization depends upon the point of view of those who characterize it.
(W. W. Willoughby, Government, The Americana: A Universal Reference Library, Frederick Converse Beach & George Edwin Rines, editors, 1912) 
Since "de jure" is an "opinion" or "relative" in the mind of the "observer," according to their "point of view," the term can be used as deemed appropriate, but it does not fit well with diplomatic recognition. That is, the terms "de facto" / "de jure" was "a rather confusing distinction, recently becoming obsolete, but once commonly used in the international practice of recognizing governments. . . ." (Boleslaw Adam Boczek, International law: A Dictionary, 2005, p. 102) It was tried for awhile and then discarded for the most part.
Because the judgment of " de jure" recognition is so indistinct, weak and obscure, legally and otherwise, no wonder countries generally refrain from the use of such distinctions in their recognitions. In fact, " The characteristic of a government as de facto or de jure belongs properly in another category of ideas and should not concern either the international jurist or the recognizing state." (Ibid., p. 689-690) " . . . Government does not pretend [except in rare instances] to express any opinion on the legality or other wise of the means by which its power has been obtained." (Ibid., p. 693) In other words, nation-states do not judge other countries as " de jure," legitimate, or just. Or on the other hand, neither do  they judge them as being unjust and unlawful, but remain neutral as a general rule. The conclusion is, " . . . Sovereignty is neither created by recognition nor destroyed by nonrecognition. (T he New Encyclopaedia Britannica, edition 15, part 3, vol 17, 1981, p. 312) In other words, international recognition of a state does not preclude the application of justice to a rightful, ethical claim of a deposed monarch or legitimate government in exile.
In fact, even membership in the United Nations does not mean a usurped title to sovereignty is set in cement. As long as there is a competent protest against a fraudulent government by a valid former ruler, then the principle of "prescription" remains in full force and power. In other words, "the right of prescription cannot be extended [to support] freebooters ['someone who takes spoils or plunder (as in war)']. . . . [because sovereignty, the highest right of power on earth, once given has] inalienable, immutable rights." (Phillip Marshall Brown, "Sovereignty in Exile," The American Journal of International Law, vol. 35, no. 4, October 1941, p. 667) Hence, ". . . the de facto government must be prepared to prove its title to possession even when it is actually or constructively in possession [of the territory]." (H. Lauterpacht, "Recognition of Insurgents as a De Facto Government," The Modern Law Review, vol. 3, no. 1, June 1939, p. 18)
" A de facto government is one which is really in possession of them [the country], although the possession may be wrongful or precarious." (op.cit., Herbert W. Briggs, p. 689) Membership in the United Nations does not change this. The only requirement for  membership in the United Nations, according to their Charter, (chapter 2, article 4) is that they are a " peace-loving" state, which accepts the " obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations." ( www.un.org/en/documents
/charter/chapter2.shtml) Membership in the United Nations only gives recognition that a government can carry on these obligations. In other words, " de jure" status is not created. For example, Kissinger [while U. S. Secretary of State] points out that his use of legitimacy 'means no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about permissible aims and methods of foreign policy.' (Harold Hance Sprout, James N. Rosenau, Margaret Tuttle Sprout, Vincent Davis & Maurice A. East, The Analysis of International Politics, 1972, p. 192) Nothing more is meant by it. The point is, " . . . De facto sovereignty [control of the terrritory] is . . . adequate to maintain the everyday authority of governments. (Allen D. Rosen, Kant's Theory of Justice, 1993, p. 142) Therefore, that is all that diplomatic recognition includes. Yet, it is still an undeniable fact that, Only de jure sovereignty confers full [and complete] legitimacy. . . ." (Ibid.) This is where the law principles of " prescription" have full sway on the authenticity of title.
What is most legally relevant and important, for lawful and legitimate title, is if there is a legitimate claimant, a rightful deposed monarch or government-in-exile that is protesting the theft of their lawful rights. If such exists and if their right to rule and govern are kept alive by competent diplomatic protest, then the usurper is effectively prevented from getting full and compete title by the principles of justice --- the rules of what is just and right and true. Such a claimant is " de jure,"  rightful, and genuine, etc. and can be so forever as long as a proper protest continues and is maintained throughout the years.
Since no one is saying a government is or is not "de jure," generally speaking, which has been true for hundred of years except for a brief period (and if they did oe do use it, it was only as a courtesy and are not legally binding), then the determination of rightfulness is being left open, unanswered and unconcluded. It is merely assumed, but is not pronounced or made definitive, absolute and final, which means "de jure" rights are not dead and gone legally, but are still alive and well for "prescription" to apply its genial ray of fairness and rightfulness. In other words, "de jure" rights can go on forever as valid, rightful and true without valid dispute.
Now that we have looked at both the negative and the positive side of recognition, remember that both lead to the same identical end. Neither de jure sovereigns, a legitimate government-in-exile or a wrongfully deposed monarch, are allowed to bring their grievances to an international court --- only recognized nation-states can participate in them. Louis A. M. Mendola, who has written a number of articles on heraldry, chivalry and royalty, declared, " . . . The underlying issue here is that in international law non-regnant royal families are sovereign de jure and therefore no juridical authority is empowered to settle [their] . . . dispute[s]." (" In Defence of (Real) History:" 2009: www.regalis.com/2sicilieshead.htm) Because, Only states are subjects of international law, the bearers of international legal obligations and powers. (Evgeny Pashukanis, " Selected Writings on Marxism and Law," P. Beirne & R. Sharlet, editors, 1980, pp.168-83,  184-5) Therefore, In the international court of justice, only governments have standing. (Justice Richard J. Goldstone, " What We have Learned," Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, Carol Anne Leuchs Prager & Trudy Govier, editors, 2003, p. 344) The problem with domestic and municipal courts is a matter of incompetent jurisdiction. Therefore, " de jure" claimants cannot ". . . transfer their quarrels to the area of the jurisdiction of its municipal Courts. (G. J. M., " International Law. Recognition De Facto. Requisition of Ship by Both De Jure and De Facto Government," The Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 7, no. 2, 1940, p. 271) There are, in fact, no courts to take these cases. They are left completely out of having any forum to protect or reclaim theirs rights.
And even if they could go to an international court, these courts are voluntary, that is, ". . . international law is dependent upon the voluntary participation of states in its formulation, observance, and enforcement." (Nelson Dordelly-Rosales, " State Sovereignty and the Protection of Human Rights," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the The Law and Society Association, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, May 27, 2008: www.allacademic.com/meta/p235808_index.html) The defacto or usurping government, in power and possession of the nation and its resources, could simply ignore the Court or any decision they made. Hence, we are back to the words of Professor Kerr that:
. . . de jure Sovereignty represents the moral principle that "might does not make right," it is [therefore] entitled to [full] recognition by other sovereigns [and all nations and all people] adhering to the moral [and ethical] principles implicit in International Law. ("King and Constitution in International Law," The Augustan, 18:4, 1977, p. 126: see: www.augustansociety.org/products/r28)
However, like most rules [or uncodified principles or standards] this [one] is usually observed in its breach [that is, in an unrealized form, such as, a broken promise] . . . in modern law. It is nevertheless, recognized as the Ideal [or what is both morally and ethically right]. (Ibid., p. 125)
But these rules are not enforced, therefore, restoration is very unlikely. However, international law on "the inviolability of sovereignty" and on "governments-in-exile" and "prescription" protect, at least on a legal level the rights of the ancient rightful rulers. After all, conceptually sovereignty is entirely an independent right without accountability to any other. It need no recognition, it just is.
Phillip Marshall Brown, a distinguished international lawyer, wrote on the sovereignty of kings and princes in exile, who were living in England and who had been robbed of the right to rule their own territories during World War II, stated that:
A nation is much more than an outward form of territory and government. . . . So long as they [those who hold sovereignty] cherish sovereignty in their hearts their nation [kingdom or principality] is not dead. It may be prostate and helpless. . . . [Nevertheless] It is not to be denied the symbols and forms of sovereignty. . . . [Their sovereignty] may be suspended, in exile, a mere figment even of reality, derided and discouraged, and yet entitled to every respect. [Why? Because we are] not dealing with fictions, [these] valiant standard bearers of sovereignty . . . in faith and confidence [have] . . . inalienable, immutable rights. (Sovereignty in Exile, 35 American Journal of International Law (1941) 666-668) ( http://links.jstor.org
 De jure sovereignty, holding the exclusive right of supreme power is forever; and it is a correct principle of justice and equity. In the words of Professor Kerr, this understanding is implicit in international law. Implicit means " without doubt or reserve," and " inherent in the nature of something." ( http://wordnetweb.princeton
Sovereignty exists as a separate entity or reality completely outside the provinces of formal recognition. It is not dependent on recognition. In fact, it is acknowledged that, "Recognition by no means produces subjects of international law. It merely creates a legal basis for relations between the recognizing and recognized states." (Vinod K. Lall & Danial Khemchand, Encyclopaedia of International Law, 1997, p. 46) It does not create or destroy sovereignty. Part of the confusion is the failure to distinquish between internal and external sovereignty. External sovereignty is what international law primarily focuses on. External sovereignty is a matter of independence or freedom from the interference of others and the right to be a member of the community of nations. This is the fundamental realm of international sovereignty law --- equality and independence.
External sovereignty consists of two elements:
1. de jure recognition by the international community of a states
independence; that is, a state in the international system is free and equal;
and
2. de facto external independence; that is, no outsider exercises control within a states territory. (Donald W Potter, "State Responsibility, Sovereignty, and Failed States," Refereed paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference University of Adelaide, 29 September-1 October 2004, pp. 11-12)
" Externally, sovereignty is the entry ticket into the society of states. Recognition on the part of other states helps to ensure territorial integrity and is the entree into participating in diplomacy and international organizations on an equal footing with other states." (Eric Brahm, " Sovereignty," September 2004: www.beyondintractability.org/essay/sovereignty)
The internal sovereignty of a State [that which is not a primary matter of interntational law] manifests itself through the performance of three governmental functions: (1) The Legislative, which makes laws; (2) The Judicial, which interprets and applies laws; (3) The Executive, which enforces laws. (William Callyhan Robinson, Elementary Law, 1910, p. 416) Internal sovereignty is supremacy or freedom to choose or make decisions within ones own territory. This most closely resembles the definition of sovereignty itself. It is defined as supreme [or ultimate power or] authority within a territory. (op.cit., Eric Brahm) This supreme domestic power had great and powerful rights as the highest power of all within the boundaries of its land. Internal sovereignty revolves around domestic law, rather than international law. It is not dependent on outside forces, but internal rules and law of the countries own making.
The rights of internal sovereignty include [whether recognized by the international world or not, that is, outside of the jurisdiction of international law, its privileges are]:
(1) The right to a free choice, settlement and alteration of the internal Constitution and Government, without the intermeddling of any Foreign State.
(2) The right to territorial inviolability, and the free use and enjoyment of property.
(3) The right of self-preservation, and this by the defence which prevents, as well as by that which repels, attack.
(4) The right to a free development of national resources by commerce.
(5) The right of acquisition, whether original or derivative, both of territorial possessions and rights.
(6) The right to absolute and uncontrolled jurisdiction over all persons and things within and, in certain exceptional cases, without the limits of the territory. [Sir Robert Phillimore, On International Law, vol. 1, sec. cxlv, 1854]
These rights are all absolute, and quite independent of any recognition of the external sovereignty by other States . . . . (Charles St. Julian, The International Status of Fiji, 1872, p. 3)
That is:
A new state does not require recognition of other states to confirm its internal sovereignty. So long as it confines its actions to its citizens and to the limits of its own territory, it may dispense with such recognition; but, if it desires to enter the society of nations, recognition becomes necessary to entitle it to participation." (New York (State) Supreme Court, The New York Supplement, vol. 195, September 11 to October 2, 1922, p. 472)
Therefore, it should not be any surprise that ". . . Courts agree that sovereignty can exist in the absence of recognition by any state. . . ." (Werner Levi, Contemporary International Law: a Concise Introduction, 1979, p. 120) The point is, " . . . sovereignty is not something that is decided by other countries. They can only recognize it or not." (Frank Muyard,  Director, Taipei Office, French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC), April 1-2, 2005: www.cefc.com.hk) Again, " The internal sovereignty of a state does not, in any degree, depend upon its recognition by other states." (John King, A Commentary on the Law and True Construction of the Federal Constitution, 1871, p. 400) It is sovereign whether it is recognized or not.
With these concepts firmly in mind, we can introduce a new and important understanding, and that is, that there is both a "de jure internal sovereignty" and a "de jure external one" which are two distinct and separate things. (op.cit., Frank Muyard) The "de jure external one" is where international law reigns. On the other hand, "de jure [rightful or legal] internal sovereignty," which international laws have little to do with, is basically, or for the most part, outside the pale or jurisdiction of the international system. But it is the primary sovereign domain of deposed monarchs and legitimate governments in exile, which explains why they are not recognized by the international system.
" Internal sovereignty is [something] . . . which is inherent [basic or deeply rooted] in the people of any State, or vested in its ruler, by its . . . constitution or fundamental laws." (Henry Wheaton & Coleman Phillipson, Wheaton's Elements of International Law, 1904, p. 35) These fundamental core rules, that are at the fountainhead of monarchy, gave sovereignty, the supreme and ultimate internal authority of the state, to the kings and sovereign princes and their families. It was established to go from father to son down through the generations and was never to end or teminate as long as these families continued to exist. This permanent royal proprietary right of internal sovereignty . . . establishes the ultimate authority [or supreme rights] over individuals or groups within the . . . territory. ( The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, part 3, vol. 17, 1981, p. 311) They are immutable, perpetual and endless. Professor Emilio Furno, an advocate in the Supreme Court of Appeal in Italy, explained:
. . . A deposed Sovereign [and his successors have an] . . . undeniable [and] . . . an absolute personal right [of full sovereignty] of which the subject [the king or sovereign prince] may never divest himself and which needs no ratification or recognition on the part of any other authority whatsoever. ("The Legitimacy of Non-National Orders", Rivista Penale, No.1, January 1961, pp. 46-70)
" A deposed monarch remained [continues], in law, a [de jure or rightful] monarch." (Charlotte Catherine Wells, Law and citizenship in early modern France, Issue 1, 1995 , p. 198) This reality is even more explicit and obvious in the international principles of prescription as shall be seen in giving deposed monarchs and their successors endless rights that last forever or can be never ending. [Sovereignty] is undivided --- there is only one truth, one justice; and, consequently, only one rightful sovereignty. It is, moreover, permanent, and unchangeable --- for truth cannot [be] altered [and still remain true]. (François Pierre G. Guizot, Lectures on European Civilization, 1837, p. 289) To be indivisible is to be inseparable, unbreakable, indestructible, permanent and inalienable. Again, " As briefly indicated above, the concept of sovereignty formally implies a power that is absolute, perpetual, indivisible, imprescriptible and inalienable." (Andrew Vincent, Nationalism and Particularity, 2002, p. 17) In other words, the very characteristics of sovereignty itself proclaim why it can be forever, if it is hereditary and legally maintained according to the international rules of prescription.
In the next answer, the rules of " prescription" will be introduced as a great boon to justice and everything that is right and good in this field. " Prescription" is one of the few principles of justice that actually deals with " de jure internal sovereignty," which most international law completely ignores. The international system chiefly covers or deals with " external sovereignty" both " de jure" and " de facto" external sovereignty, and not the deepest, most fundamental and inalienable powers of rightful sovereignty that pertain to deposed monarchs and legitimate governments in exile. 
(4) Dynasty never forfeits its rights. Those rights cannot be forfeited. The principle of juris sanguinis (right of blood) operates here. Dr. Paulo Bonavides in his book "Political Sciences" (Ciência Política), page 126 declared:
Sovereignty is one and indivisible, it cannot be delegated, SOVEREIGNTY IS IRREVOCABLE, SOVEREIGNTY IS PERPETUAL, sovereignty is a supreme power, these are the main points of characterization that made Bodin's sovereignty in the seventeenth century an essential element of State.
It is important to understand that there is nothing special or magical about juris sanguinis or right of blood. It is nothing more or less than inheritance law. This concept originally came from the once believed theory called the " Divine Right of Kings," that lived and died in the 17th and 18th centuries. " Divine right of kings" gave birth to the sovereignty of monarchs involving total independence from Rome, which was its greatest contribution. The idea that monarchs were direct representative of God, could do no wrong, and that their royal blood was better than a commoner's blood was discarded, but the idea that a successor's right to rule was heredity or royal patrimony survived. Hence, juris sanguinis, right of blood or birthright is nothing more or less than a hereditary right in accord with  inheritance law. The heir received the property and/or the intangible right to rule from his sire or father, the king or sovereign prince of the realm. Sovereignty fundamentally concerns the body politic ["regnum" the kingdom or domain that a successor inherits] and not the body [or royal blood] of the king or queen. (Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: evolution of an idea, 2007, p. 63) In fact, " juris sanguinis" by definition merely means in " . . . principle that a person's nationality at birth is the same as that of his natural parents." ( www.thefreedictionary
In other words, juris sanguinis is no different than any other inheritable right that comes by birth. Just as a commoner can lose his citizenship by various means, so a prince of the royal blood can lose, not only the privilege to rule the kingdom, but through abandonment, abdication, alienation, renunciation, cession, acquiescence or prescription, he can also, or in addition, altogether lose his royalty and every right that goes with it, and thus become a commoner with no royal or imperial prerogative left. This means to lose without recourse the privilege of using exalted titles or to preside over a true order of chivalry, etc. The point is, any birthright can be ruined and totally destroyed by bad choices, foolishness, serious crime or neglect, which will be explained in the following paragraphs.
Dr. Bonavides statement above is true. Sovereignty can be irrevocable and perpetual, but his statement does not tell the equally important other side of the story. It does not tell the whole-complete-fullness of truth --- the critical qualifiers are missing and they are extremely important to the truth or falsehood of all royal claims. A deeper understanding of sovereignty and the  principles that surround it clearly demonstrate the truth that royalty can be lost, and that loss is just as permanent and endless as its potential maintenance is eternal and forever. In other words, once lost, it cannot be renewed, started over or reinstitution after the fact. Johann Wolfgang Textor von Goethe, (1749-1832) the famous German publicist and International lawyer, declared:
. . . a King who has been driven from his Kingdom by force of arms, and has lost possession of his [territorial or defacto] sovereignty, has not thereby lost his right, or at any rate not irrevocably, unless he has in the meanwhile given his assent [his acquiescence] thereto; but he loses it conclusively at the moment when he consents [acquiesces or agrees] to transfer of it to the Estates, i.e. Parliament or to his rebel subjects, and then it must be recognized that the Kingdom has been made into a State which has been founded in accordance with the Law of Nations. (Synopsis of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, 1680, p. 88)
He explained that:
The modes of acquiring Kingdoms under the Law of Nations are: Election [elected to office], Succession [ruling rights given to a lawful heir], Conquest [creating "defacto" sovereignty and usurping a lawful king or complete and total subjugation leaving no one to carry on the governing rights of the nation --- this is called debellatio], Alienation [the ceding or giving away of the kingdom to another] and Prescription [which we will discuss]." (Ibid., p. 77)
"De jure" or lawful sovereignty is lost by the legal principles of "conquest," "alienation" and "prescription." We will look at "prescription" as a particularly important legal concept that destroys de jure imperial and royal rights to title and royal prerogatives, but can also preserve and maintain them forever. Lassa Francis L. Oppenheim (1858-1919), a renowned German jurist regarded by many as the father of the discipline of international law, wrote:
. . . Prescription in International Law may . . . be deemed as the acquisition of sovereignty over a territory through continuous and undisturbed exercise of sovereignty over it. . . . ( International Law, vol. 1, Ch. XIII, No. 242, 1910, p. 309)
As long as other Powers [the "de jure" sovereign in this context] keep[s] up protests and claims [his royal rights, then they are safe]. . . . But after such protests and claims, if any, cease to be repeated, the actual possession [of sovereignty] ceases to be disturbed. . . . (Ibid., pp. 309-310)
Then the royal king or prince ceases to be a true king or prince as his "de jure" rights are forfeited to the usurper. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Law Enforcement:
Prescription ([in] international law) [is] the acquisition of title [ownership] to territory through an uncontested exercise of sovereignty over an extended period of time. Prescription presupposes a prior sovereign authority whose control and administration over the territory in question has lapsed through:
failure to occupy, 
failure to administer,
abandonment or neglect,
a wrongful original claim, or
. . . If a state takes over the territory of another state and treats it as its own territory, the other state [the "de jure" sovereign in this case] has an obligation to protest. If it [or he] does not, the silence may be considered acquiescence [or acceptance] to the prescription [or an abandonment]. ( www.taiwandocuments.org/sovereignty.htm)
Abandonment, neglect or failure to contest a claim are all ways to lose rights permanently and forever. Again, " For prescription to apply, the state with title [the de jure king or his successors] to the [lost] territory must acquiesce to the action of the other [the usurper or defacto] state." ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_status_of_Taiwan)
Emerich de Vattel, one of the most important of the founding fathers of international law, wrote:
Every proprietor [of the great honor and privilege of "de jure" sovereignty] who expressly commits, or omits, certain acts [such as, the express failure to use his titles], which he cannot commit or omit without renouncing his right, sufficiently indicates by such commission or omission that it is not his intention to preserve it, unless, by an express reservation, he declare the contrary. (See The Law of Nations, Book II, ch. XI, Nos. 142, 144-146, 149 and see Article 45 and Article 31.3(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties)
However, Stephen P. Kerr, B.B.A., J.D., LL.M., M.A.T., a World Court Litigator and Special International Legal Counsel to the House of Habsburg-Lorraine and a Professor of Law at Antioch University Law School in Washington, D.C., made it clear that, ". . .de jure possession of sovereignty continues so long as the de jure ruler or government does not surrender his sovereignty [his rightful claim] to the usurper." (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis Juris Gentium, Chapter 10, Nos. 9-11) Professor Kerr also declared that:
Upon the fall, dispossession, or usurpation of a monarchy, the de jure legal rights to the succession of that monarchy may be kept alive indefinitely [that is, without an end, continually] through the legal vehicle of making diplomatic protests against the usurpation. (See: " Dynastic Law") (See Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or Le Droit des gens, Book II, Chapter II, Nos. 145-146)
 In other words, " Such Claimants are de jure Sovereigns and, as such, Head of the Government-in-Exile of their usurped country." (Ibid.) However, when the protest ceases, the royal rights are extinguished. That is, " It [the loss of 'de jure' sovereignty] depends as much on the quiescence [inactivity or lack of effort] of the former sovereign as on the consolidation [of rulership] through time of the new. (R. Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 23) In other words, " Title must be maintained, or it will be lost as a result of failure to . . . protest the actions of an acquiring power. Conduct [therefore] is thus very important. (Ibid., p. 5) It is, in fact, extremely important, because, " After a reasonable period of time, to be determined in each case on an ad hoc basis, the title will vest in the new state in the absence of protest. It might be mentioned at this point that protests are extremely important in international law." (Ibid., p. 5) It is so important that, The absence of protest . . . forms a constituent element of --- estoppel or prescription. Like these two generally accepted legal principles, the far-reaching effect of the failure to protest is not a mere artificiality of the law. It is an essential requirement [to keep one's rights alive]. . . ." (Hersh Lauterpacht, International Law: General Works, 1977, p. 164) 
(5) How does a royal family maintain their rights? What is required? What is the proper protest that is acceptable and protective?
Loss of title is achieved through acquiescence. D. H. N. Johnson explained that:
Such acquiescence is implied . . . where the interested and affected states [deposed kings or their successors in our case] have failed within a reasonable period of time to refer the matter to the appropriate international organization or international tribunal or . . . where no such action was possible --- have failed to manifest their opposition in a sufficiently positive manner through the instrumentality of diplomatic protests. ("Acquisitive Prescription in International Law," British Journal of International Law 27, 1950, pp. 332, 353-354)
Again, ". . . mere diplomatic protest is not sufficient. It must be followed by a reference to an appropriate international organization or international tribunal unless it is not possible to do so." (S. K. Verma, An Introduction to Public International Law, 2004, p. 121) Because of the powerful biases against monarchy, no international tribunal will take on a case involving a "de jure" monarch's, or his successor's, right to rule his kingdom or principality. For example, the International Court of Justice, according to their own guidelines, will not take any case that does not involve currently recognized sovereign states. So how does a "de jure" monarch, or his successors, maintain their rights?
According to Emerich de Vattel (1614-1667), considered one of the founding fathers of international law, the way to keep and maintain imperial or royal rights alive forever was by  protest, which was elaborated in question and answer number 3 on the principle of prescription. He declared, With sovereigns [kings or sovereign princes the way to do so] is . . . to retain the title and the arms of a sovereignty or a province, as an evidence that they do not relinquish their claims to it." ( The Law of Nations, Book 2, Chapter XI, Nos. 145-146)
This is the bottom line. Other kinds of protests are helpful or ancillary, but using titles are the most fundamental, basic and necessary way to proclaim to the world that one has not given in, but still retains the claim to the full majesty and glory of the monarchy. This is the bare minimum. Stephen Kerr, a world court litigator, declared, "when appropriate, recognizing worthy individuals with knighthoods and other decorations or honor at their command" further confirms their royal status as active members of the international community and as rightful heirs to their former "defacto" thrones. (op.cit.) Such an act is equal to "a series of competent protests [which] will keep a de jure claim alive indefinitely" or forever. (Ibid.)
If the royal family forsakes, or no longer considers the titles important enough to use in one generation, and the possible heir does not claim his right before the death of his negligent father, then a presumption of abandonment is automatically made, which means a total forfeiture has occurred. This action means a permanent end to their special and unique entitlements --- royal rights that cannot be revived or renegotiated. It is final or set in stone. It can't be fixed. Dr. Stephen Kerr specifies that:
De jure Sovereignty lasts as long as the claimant keeps up his protest against the usurpation of his Sovereignty [which means it can last forever]. This is done by means of diplomatic protests. Such diplomatic protests are issued on the death of one claimant upon the occasion that the new claimant takes up the claim. (Letter of 1/21/10)
This is why one generation can destroy all rights.
Nobiliary International law states that the heads of the Houses of sovereign descent who have not incurred debellatio, retain forever the exercise of the powers attaching to them, absolutely irrespective of any territorial possession. They are protected by the continued use of their rights and titles of nobility. . . . (Monarchist World Magazine # 2, August 1955)
The reason a de jure monarch, or his successors, must use their titles to keep their royal rights was explain by Vattel in The Law of Nations. (www.constitution.org
/vattel/vattel_02.htm) It stated as an introduction that:
. . . the law of nature lays an injunction on the proprietor to take care of his property, and imposes on him an obligation to make known his rights, that others may not be led into error: it is on these conditions alone that she approves of the property vested in him, and secures him in the possession. (Book II, Number 141)
Now for the conclusion and the result:
If he has neglected it [failed to assert his titles] for such a length of time . . . the law of nature will no longer allow him to revive and assert his claims. . . . (Ibid.)
Again:
. . . the law of nature ordain that all men should respect the right of private property in him who makes use of it? For the same reason, therefore, the same law requires that every proprietor who for a long time and without any just reason neglects his right, should be presumed to have entirely renounced and abandoned it. This is what forms the absolute presumption (juris et de jure) of its abandonment, --- a presumption, upon which another person [the subsequent government] is legally entitled to appropriate to himself the thing so abandoned. (Ibid.)
(6) Where is a modern court decree that sustains this principle?
 The " Permanent Court of Arbitration" at The Hague heard the Island of Palmas case. In 1925, the United States brought a complaint against the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It involved who has the supreme right to rule, or own the sovereignty over this territory which is near the Philippines. The legal principle of " prescription" was used to determined the outcome of who has both " de jure," or lawful sovereignty, as well as " defacto" or physical control over the land and its people, which was completed in 1928. The " de jure" sovereign (The United States) lost all rights, because of their neglect, while the Dutch acted as sovereign rulers over this territory and its people over a long, uncontested period of time without any protest or claim made by the U.S. government. All the conditions of " prescription" were present. Hence, the Kingdom of the Netherlands was awarded recognition for having title to all the " de jure" privileges and prerogatives.
The United States actually lost their " de jure" rights long before the Tribunal occurred because they totally neglected their claim and made no protest whatsoever, which is required to keep the intangible right to rule and govern. " A title [to sovereignty] once abandoned whether tacitly [by implication] or expressly, cannot be resumed [continued, started over or reconstituted]." (T. Twiss, The Oregon Question Examined, 1840, p. 24) In other words, the principle of " estoppel" is automatically applied, which establishes that a " . . . person is prevented from arguing and rebutting a previously made (explicit [that is, straightforward] or tacit [which means implied]) statement of fact or representation on [the] same issue." (Nuno Sérgio Marques Antunes, " Estoppel, acquiescence and recognition in territorial and boundary dispute," Boundary and Territory Briefing, vol. 2, no. 8, 2000, p. 4) 
In other words, they are precluded from later ". . . making claims to the contrary." (www.belluckfox.com/legal-glossarye.html) Estoppel law applies where a person knows or ought to know that he is entitled to enforce his right and neglects to do so for such a length of time as would imply that he intended to waive or abandon his right. Thus, ". . . Acquiescence [silence on the part of a "de jure" king or his successors] . . . acts as a preclusion or estoppel . . . [in other words, it results in a permanent] waiver of rights. . . ." (E. Lauterpacht, International Law Reports 33, 1967, p. 91) The entitlement, then, is extinguished and the loss is total, complete and absolute. It cannot be taken back or renewed. It is effectively destroyed.
Three international law concepts or principles impact "de jure" sovereign or royal rights:
2. " . . . The concept of acquiescence is similar to that of implied waiver [or implied consent, implied abandonment or the implied renunciation of all rights]." (Ibid.) In acquiescence, " . . . the claimant State [or "de jure" monarch or his successors] has failed to assert its [or his] claim and that it thereby has implicitly accepted its extinction." (Ibid.) " . . . Both implied waiver and acquiescence are based on the same rationale, namely the idea that a certain statement may be inferred from conduct, be it action or inaction." (Ibid.)
3. Extinctive prescription happens when ". . . a State [or "de jure" king or his rightful successors] that does not present claims . . . within a given period of time permanently loses its right to do so, even where it has not acquiesced in their extinction." (Ibid.)
"Waiver, acquiescence and extinctive prescription are legal concepts entailing the same effect they lead to the loss of a right or claim." (Ibid.) "Once the conditions for any of them are met, the claimant States right [or "de jure" monarch's right] . . . ceases to exist." (Ibid.) (See also the International Law Commission's commentary to article 45 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
The point is, a " de jure" title to sovereignty must be perpetuated constantly in every generation. Professor D. H. N. Johnson declared, " As Judge Huber indicated in the Island of Palmas case, it is necessary that a title be . . . continuously maintained. . . . ( Consolidation as a Root of Title in International Law, The Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2, Nov. 1955, p. 223) Otherwise it is lost forever.
Judge Huber [in the Island of Palmas case on sovereignty] did well to stress the importance of maintaining titles as well as acquiring them, because there is a tendency among the writers to place less emphasis upon this aspect of the matter. It is true that methods of losing titles are sometimes classified along with methods of acquiring them. But this practice seems to presuppose that, if a title is not actually lost through one of the recognized methods of loss, it is automatically maintained. (Ibid., p. 224)
In other words, there is both " acquisitive prescription" and " extinctive prescription." (S. K. Verma, An Introduction to Public International Law, 2004, p. 121) In " extinctive prescription" " de jure" rights are revoked if the title is not " continuously maintained." (Ibid.) In other words, de jure sovereignty is not " automatically maintained." It must be kept up and renewed in  every generation. As an absolute minimum, royal rights are continued by the consistent, uninterrupted use of royal titles and arms. Or, a loss of this precious legal reality is the sure and absolute. Once lost, the only way this could be legally fixed is if the nation as a whole makes one of the disenfranchised descendants, who is now merely a commoner with no special rights, their new sovereign and a new dynasty is created or begone anew.
Although " prescription" cases are somewhat rare in modern times, still the law is upheld as genuine and applicable to cases involving sovereignty as they arise. " The principle of extinctive prescription (bars of claims by lapse of time) is widely recognized as a general principle of law constituting part of international law; and has been accepted and applied by arbitral tribunals." (Greenriver Enterprizes Six Nations, Inc., et al., v. United States (Decisions on Objections to Jurisdiction, 20 Jul. 2006) For example, " In the case Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium/Netherlands) (1959 ICJ Rep. 209), the ICJ [International Court of Justice fully] accepted the possibility of acquiring title to territory by prescription." (Boleslaw Adam Boczek, International law: a dictionary, 2005, p. 242) Another official reliance on the principle of " prescription" took place in 1982 wherein Argentina  " ceded sovereignty to Britain by extinctive prescription." There was no need to bring this to court, it is just a known reality in full accord with international law. Argentina failed to fulfill their part to maintain their claim when it had the opportunity. Therefore, it lost its " de jure" sovereign claim to govern and rule the Falkland Islands. (Daniel K. Gibran, The Falklands War: Britain versus the past in the South Atlantic, 1977, p . 42)
It is important to note that this loss did not require legal action or a court decree to make it final and permanent. All that is needed is a well documented history of the act of legal waiver, acquiescence or prescription to prove it. (Ibid.) In other words, the proof is self-evident, apparent and obvious. This is important to the loss of "de jure" sovereignty of kings and sovereign princes, or their heirs and successors, because no court will accept their claims for adjudication. But the principles themselves and the historical evidence, outside of court, proclaims the real truth.
Recognition in modern times of the ancient law of prescription sustains its validity and legitimacy, but the higher laws of what is just and right and true are, in our minds, far more important. A country that robs a king or sovereign prince of his " defacto" right to rule over his own territory by usurpation of any kind is obviously wrong. " Prescription" at least gives the plundered  royal family the " right" to be recognized as royal forever as long as they continue to use their titles and arms and never given in or acquiesce.
Some further court cases include:
1. "Right of Passage over Indian Territory (1960)" Portugal claimed a right of passage for some villages it was said to have sovereignty over and which were surrounded by Indian territory. India, in this International Court of Justice case, lost by virtue of their "acquiescence" and Portugal's continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty. (Randall Lesaffer, "Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law: Occupation and Acquisitive Prescription," The European Journal of International Law, vol. 16, no.1, 2005, p. 53)
2. "Kasikili/Sedudu (1999)" Even though "the ICJ . . . agreed that prescription was a rule of international law, Namibia failed to prove it actually occurred. (Ibid., p. 56)
3. " Sovereignty over Pulau Litigan and Pulau Sipadan (2002)" In a case of Indonesia and the Netherlands, the Court recognized the peaceful (undisturbed by protest) and continuous  display of State authority by Indonesia; such that, all Dutch " de jure" claims were dismissed as empty and invalid. (Ibid., pp. 54-55)
"Prescription had been invoked as a mode of transferring sovereignty over territory long before the 18th century." (Ibid., p. 48) It has a long history from time immemorial. Prescription, and prescription by any other name (some have labeled it "positive occupation," is not the only way sovereignty is extinguished or forfeited. But it ". . . ranks among the five modes of acquiring [sovereign] territory in international law." (Ibid., p. 46) "It does not apply to terra nullius [or uninhabited land]." (Ibid.) That is the acquisition of sovereignty by "occupation." The principle of prescription, which includes acquiescence, and the principle of alienation are the most applicable to "de jure" sovereignty, the sovereignty of nonreigning monarchs, and their successors, either to extinguish their royal rights and privileges or to protect them as long as the family does not become extinct; and, as a minimum, continues to use their exalted titles and the arms of their monarchy in every generation thereafter. As hereditary rights can go on forever or endlessly, so can the right of being a true and authentic royal or noble be maintained as a permanent possession to the end of all time.
(7) Has "prescription" ever involved a whole complete nation-state in modern times?
Yes, in 1950, the kingdom of Tibet was invaded and illegally conquered by the People's Republic of China who usurped the rights of the whole priest/monarchy and committed untold atrocities against an innocent people. A government in exile, with His Holiness, the Dalai Lama as it's "de jure" head, was established in India. They are officially called the "Central Tibetan Administration of His Holiness the Dalai Lama" (CTA) and consist of about 100,000 people. They claim to be the rightful and legitimate government of Tibet.
When a foreign invader or local insurgents have occupied a state, its government may flee abroad and, provided the state of refuge agrees, operate as a government in exile [or monarchy in exile] with the same legal status as it [or he] had before. (Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law, 2005, p. 25-26)
In other words, as stated by Stephen P. Kerr, this right is " implicit in international law." But, " There is nothing to force countries to recognize such governments in exile, as long as they are unable to exercise real control over all or part of the territory they claim to represent. . . ." (Joint Publications Research Service report, JPRS-NEA-89-005, 17 JANUARY 1989, United States: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, p. 12) However, recognition may be implied in the act by which a state gives its consent to the establishment of the seat of the exile government on its territory. (Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2003, p. 290) Indian has given this recognition to the CTA. However, this implied recognition is external, not internal. The international community does not recognize or deal with internal  sovereignty, which is where the most important or supreme and ultimate authority lies. This is neglected, but it is legal, rightful sovereignty that is fitting, ethically and morally right, fair, just, legitimate, authentic, lawful and true.
In spite of tremendous pressure from the usurper China, the very existence of the CTA and its claims under "prescription" prevents the full and complete recognition of China as "de jure" sovereigns over the Tibet. This is because the Dalai Lama and the CTA have never acquised, never abdicated, never given up or given in.
However, like most "de jure" sovereigns today, the Dalai Lama, and the CTA, are not officially recognized. Nevertheless, the international law principle of "prescription" protects "de jure" sovereignty as legitimate and authentic. Therefore, even though the cause of the Dalai Lama is not officially recognized, it is respected and recognized as what is --- right and true.
In fact, . . . few [Western nations] do not have a monarch reigning either de jure or de facto. . . . Although they continue to elect Presidents [and] . . . maintain representational government [they] still have a monarch either recognized by the government, or by . . . [many of the] people at large, and though essentially powerless, these monarchs maintain a symbolic link between a nation and its heritage --- its most sacred, most ancient traditions. They also constitute a government-in-waiting. . . . (Tracy R. Twyman, " Monarchy: The Primordial Form of Government:" http://quintessentialpublications.com/twyman/?page_id=48)
As with other cases of disposed monarchs, no international court will accept such a case, as the claims of a government and/or monarch in exile, so it is sufficient for them under " prescription" to merely exist and use their titles to maintain the dispute. All the CTA must do is continue and never cease to exist, in name and purpose, to forever perpetuate its rightful claims. All a " de jure" king, and/or his successors, must do is use their titles and arms to  perpetuate its dormant rights forever. These rights can last " ad infinitum" or be permanent and without end. Why?, because, " de jure sovereignty is supreme, unchallenged, legal authority." (The Rt. Hon. Chris Patten, CH, Sovereignty, democracy and constitutions: http://dspace.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/41595
/2/chris-patten.pdf) That is, it is supreme or above all. If the rights are maintained, The absent sovereign remains the de jure government of the country [even though they are never officially recognized]. (Oppenheimer, Governments and Authorities in Exile, American Journal of International Law, p. 571) (Hersch Lauterpacht, C. J. Greenwood, International Law Reports, p. 559) And this can last forever provided the protest continues down through the corridors of time by the sovereign's lawful successors. The point is, it is inviolable. It cannot be violated under these circumstances, which " . . . means that the occupying power may obtain de facto sovereignty [sovereignty 'in practice' or 'in fact'], but the ousted sovereign retains it de jure [that is, 'in principle' or in the original and immutable law]." (Karen Guttieri,Making Might Right: The Legitimization of Occupation, p. 13 : www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research
Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, 1st Sovereign Prince of Beneventum (1754-1838) widely regarded as one of the most versatile and influential diplomats in European history, explained, "A sovereign whose state is under conquest (if he be a hereditary sovereign) does not cease to be sovereign, unless he has ceded his right or renounces it, nor does he lose [it] by the conquest . . . ." (Duc de Broglie, editor, Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand, vol 2, 1932, p. 160) In other words, he holds all sovereignty --- the highest intangible incorporeal right to rule and govern whether he has possession of the territory or not, and unless he cedes or renounces his royal rights, he holds them forever. Renunciation, of course, can take place at any time afterwards and can be implied by a failure to use the sovereign titles or be implied by a failure to protest in some other effective manner.
The world must know, in no uncertain terms, that neither he, nor his successors, have ever abandoned their claim to the crown and royal rights of their  ancestors. Otherwise, lack of concrete evidence could play a part in forfeiture.
(8) Is there an example of the protective power of the principle of "prescription"?
It is important to understand that royal rights were not only destroyed by "prescription," but redeemed, established and maintained by it. In fact, dynastic sovereignty [which is supreme, is founded, upheld and] based on prescription. (Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: evolution of an idea, 2007, p. 61) Kings, and sovereign princes, claimed legitimacy or the full right and entitlement to rule their nation-states. Conventionally, such a claim is called or defined by prescription.
"Prescription" should be understood as a claim or title or right to something based on long [and rightfully unchallenged] use or enjoyment of it [the right to govern]. . . . Prescription was . . . another word for possession, proprietary right and, indeed, ownership [full and complete ownership thereof]: a lawful title of possession of a territory [land or nation-state], a right to control its affairs, and, to that end, to command its population [which is a fundamental component of sovereignty]. . . . (Ibid., p. 62)
"Dynastic sovereignty, resting on prescription. . . ." provided a firm and solid foundation for monarchy or any kind of government. (Ibid., p. 64) Prince Talleyrand, explained:
A lawful government . . . is always one whose existence, form and mode of action, has been consolidate and consecrated by a long succession of years. . . . The legitimacy of the sovereign power results from the ancient status of possession, just as, for private individuals, does the right of property. (Ibid., p. 65)
"Prescription," or rightful title to property and ownership by the king or sovereign prince, protected a nation-state from the horrors, terror and bloodshed that comes from anarchy and revolution. He espoused, ". . . prescription as the definitive [best or greatest] claim to sovereignty. . . . [In other words] prescription was conducive to peace [political stability and goodwill] and was in everybodies interests." (Ibid.)
. . . Prescription, is justly applicable . . . the constant and approved practice of nations shows that by whatever name it be called, the uninterrupted possession of territory or other property for a certain length of time by one State excludes the claim of every other in the same manner, as, by the law of nature and the municipal code of every civilized nation. . . . (Henry Wheaton & Alexander Charles Boyd, Elements of International Law, 1880, p. 120)
Again, it is important to understand that royal rights were not only destroyed by "prescription" as it supports established governments, but it is redeemed, established and maintained by it. In other words, ". . . 'Prescription' . . . was in practice the most important criteria [on earth] to legitimise the State, irrespective of its origins," and it still is an important legal doctrine of modern international law. (Joaquin Varela Suanzes, "Sovereignty in British Legal Doctrine," Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, vol 6, no. 3, September 1999, #100) In fact, ". . . the concept of prescription (which legitimizes title through the passage of time) seems to be enjoying something of a revival in the post-Cold War Era." (Cherry Bradshaw, Bloody nations: moral dilemmas for nations, states and international relations, 2008, p. 54) In other words, it is increasingly recognized that "prescription" is a powerful ancient doctrine, which has earned worldwide respect and admiration for being just, equitable, and fair as well as being practical in not only solving property problems, but for sovereignty issues for territories and whole nation-states.
 But, as explained in previous answers, it also destroys sovereignty, royal titles and privileges " ad infinitum." This is why " prescription" is so important, as a central issue, in determining true or false claims, especially in regard to those whose ancestors failed to maintain their rights after losing " defacto" rule. Emerich de Vattel tells us that " prescription:
. . . requires that every proprietor [ a "de jure," rightful or dispose sovereign], who for a long time and without any just reason neglects his right [to protest or use his or her titles and arms], should be presumed to have entirely renounced and abandoned it." (The Law of Nations, Book II, ch. XI, no. 141)
Vattel then explains, that, "This is what forms the absolute presumption (juris & de jure) of its abandonment. . . ." (Ibid.) "Juris" in this context means legally "conclusive" --- something that cannot be rebuttaled or refutted, and "de jure" means an absolute right, such that, "prescription" or abandonment creates a permanent and endless loss that cannot be renewed. Hence, it is critical that royal families not forfeit their rights by silence or implied waiver, renunciation or acquiescence.
Professor Ralph Ralston declared prescription is " well recognized in international law" ( The American Journal of International Law, vol. 4, no. 1, January 1910, p. 133) It is a " right of humanity." (Ibid., p. 137) And " the principle of prescription finds its foundation in the highest equity. . . ." (Ibid., p. 138) It punishes carelessness, lack of concern and negligence, and rewards effort, responsibility and good desires that are played out appropriately. " The principle of prescription rests on silence as an implication of consent, but there can be no implication of consent when dissent is explicit [that is, made obvious and undeniable]." (Alfred P. Rubin, "The Position of Tibet in International Law," The China Quarterly, no. 35, July - September 1968, p. 141) The absence of protest . . . forms a constituent element of --- estoppel or prescription. Like these two generally accepted legal principles, the far-reaching effect of the failure to protest is not a mere artificiality of the law. It is an essential requirement . . . a requirement even more important in the international than in other spheres. . . . (Hersh Lauterpacht, International Law: General Works, 1977, p. 164)
The problem is when a deposed monarch does not use his or her titles, which becomes an act of silence, implied abandonment,acquiescence or absense of protest. "Acquiescence involves inaction by a State [or deposed monarch], that is, 'silence or absence of protest in circumstances which generally call for a positive reaction signifying an objection.'" (I. C. MacGibbon, "The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law," British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 31. 1954, p. 767) In other words, loss occurs through "A long-continued prescription or possession of sovereignty, without opposition or reluctation [or protest and such behavior], implies a full consent, and derives [or provides] a good title of inheritance [to the usurper], both before God and man." (Bramhall, "The Serpent-Salve," Works, III, 467. Cf. p. 318)
If such has taken place, certification or recognition is impossible. On the other hand, if they maintain their rights by using their titles, etc., and never fail throughout their generations to do so, then they can rightfully enjoy their royal prerogatives forever.
(9) If prescription, abandonment and implied abandonment are so important, why aren't they considered laws? They appear to be merely principles and as such have little or no power to do what a law would.
The International Law Commission of the United Nations has answered that. Concerning disputes of sovereignty:
. . . The subject has remained untouched by the codification movement. The reasons for that fact are perhaps not difficult to explain. The salient aspect of this part of international law lies in the rules relating to the original acquisition of territorial sovereignty by discovery, occupation, conquest and prescription. Rights and claims . . . have been traditionally regarded as synonymous with the most vital interest of States, and it is perhaps not surprising that there has been a reluctance to case the applicable rules of law in the form of codified principles which might be involved immediately, with some eagerness, by parties to pending disputes. This has been so throughout the last century [where] a number of territorial disputes; still unresolved have been pending and that the adoption of any rules would, in many cases run counter to the interests or views propounded by the parties to existing controversies. (Survey of International Law 1949, Chapter III: Jurisdiction of States, (5) The Territorial Domain of States, No. 64, pp. 38-39)
Attempts have often been made to establish rules as to usucapio and prescription in the case of the acquisition of sovereignty; but those rules merely state vague analogies. (Parliamentary Papers, Great Britain,1896, p. 12)
[Hence, sovereignty law] has remained almost entirely outside the efforts at codification. . . ." (op.cit., Survey of International Law)
One reason for this is the rights of sovereignty is too touchy and dangerous a subject which has resulted in terrible wars, ruin, waste and bloodshed; hence, the reluctance is reasonable and truly in the best interest of all parties.
[However] situations of great complexity going back into the distant past [when kings ruled] and affecting considerable territories can be solved by the application of legal rules. . . . These rules, while admitting of a pronounced measure of elasticity in their application, are clear in principle. (Ibid.)
In other words, the principles have been effective " as is" and they allow the greater flexibility needed to address complex situations. This flexibility goes very deep to the point " . . . that there is no hierarchy of sources in international law, and customary law and conventions may freely interact and influence, one another. (Mark Eugen Villiger, Customary international law and treaties, 1985, p. 292-293) Why?, because . . . jus scriptum, namely codification, `freezes' or immobilizes law. The results is a straight-jacket of inflexibility. (Ibid.) For this reason, flexibility is a governing principle, not exactness and precision in law. In fact, instead of attempting to use strict adherence to codified laws in all  cases, as is typical of domestic courts, " . . . the liberty [is given to the International Court of Justice] to decide ex aequo et bono ("in justice and fairness"), granting the ICJ the freedom to make an equitable decision based on what is fair under the circumstances." ( http://en.wikipedia
(10) Are there no exceptions to the loss of de jure internal sovereignty through prescription?
Hugo Grotius gave a very important one. He wrote, " . . . in order that silence may establish the presumption of abandonment of ownership, two conditions are requisite, that the silence be that of one who acts with knowledge and of his own free will. For the failure to act on the part of one who does not know is without legal effect." ( On the Law of War and Peace, Book I, chapter IV, number 5) Not only is free will essential, but if there has been ignorance through deception or undue influence, duress, threat or some other unlawful means, then the presumption of silence and abandonment is null and void. Hugo Grotius made it clear that," Contracts, or promises [in this case the promise of continued recognition as rulers] obtained by fraud, violence or undue fear [perpetrated by a government or some other unlawful force] entitle the injured party to full restitution."  ( www.constitution.org/gro/djbp_217.htm) Obviously, criminal acts do not create lawful rights. But absent of any valid excuse, all rights are lost. Anything created can be destroyed through the the legal principles of justice and fairness, which is why these principles are so critical to the future of nobility and royalty.
Justice also demands that, " . . . all men are to restore what they are possessed of, if another is proved to be the rightful owner." (Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Book II, Chapter 10:1: www.constitution.org/gro/djbp_210.htm) This is why prescription protects lawful rights from ever dying, because justice does not condone theft or unfairness. The rights of sovereignty can continue forever if they are maintained in accordance with the principles of " prescription."
(11) Some experts believe that monarchs never could cede, sell or alienate their nation-states.
In truth, the greatest nations and the haughtiest rulers have engaged in such transactions; selling as the circumstances suited them outlying provinces of their vast estates. England, France, Germany, Russia furnish instances of this kind of traffic. A King of England sold Dunkerque to France. Napoleon sold the Mississippi valley to America. Most of the mediatised princes of Germany sold their sovereign rights for money. During the Caliph's own reign Russia has sold her great province of Alaska to the United States. Denmark has sold her duchy of Lauenburg to the King of Prussia. France has recently bought up the sovereignty in Monaco. Not many years ago the] Prince of Mingrelia sold his sovereign rights to Russia for a pension, [and more recently the Elector of Hesse-Cassel sold such remnants of his] --- rights as had survived defeat to Germany. No one denies that such transfers of authority are legitimate, if they are carried out with due regard to all existing rights. In India we have bought up sovereignty after sovereignty. Not long since the King of Holland was on the point of vending Luxemburg to France. (John Nichols, The Gentleman's Magazine, vol. 240, January - June 1876, p. 176)
The conclusion here is that, ". . . International Code specifically provides . . . that sovereignty may be bought and sold. . . .'" (Oscar William Coursey, The Philippines and Filipinos, 1914, p. 101) Of course, the likelihood of this happening today is, obviously, extremely low, but not impossible as we shall see. The buying and selling of whole sovereign principalities in totum after the Empire collapsed and ceased to exist is particularly germaine. The reason why this distinction is important is shown by the following two quotes:
1. The French ambassador to the Imperial Reichstag in July of 1806 issued a note stating that each state was thus a full and independent nation of Europe. He stated emphatically that Napoleon as Emperor and King recognized " the complete and absolute sovereignty of each of the princes [and the idea of] . . . maintaining with them the same relations as with the other independent [sovereign nations or] powers of Europe." ( http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/516)( http://personal.ashland
2. " The dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire meant that anyone who was previously a direct vassal of the Emperor without any intermediary (in other words, was unmittelbar or 'immediate') became ipso facto [by that very fact] sovereign. [In other words, they] ceased to be subject to any superior authority." ( www.heraldica.org
However, even before 1806, after the Treaty of Westphalian in 1648, the 300 or so principalities of the Holy Roman Empire became virtually sovereign. That is, "Each prince or king became an emperor in his own realm." (Andrew Vincent, Nationalism and Particularity, 2002, p. 17) "Although technically still a part of the empire (which would last in name until 1806), these [German] principalities gained all the trappings of sovereign statehood." (Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 29) "The Treaty of Westphalia gave virtually all the small states in the heart of Europe sovereignty, thus formally rendering the Holy Roman Emperor politically impotent [similar to a committee chairman of some 300 plus independent little sovereign nations loosely connected together]. . . ." (Thorbjorn L. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory, Manchester University Press, 1992, p. 71)
 Keep in mind that the following little " countries" that were ceded were independent sovereign European nations and they were separate entities from each other. For example, even though the Principality of Cammin was part of the Kingdom of Prussia, this little principality was considered to be a distinct and independent realm; such that, the King of Prussia, the owner and sovereign, was recognized as the actual monarch or princely ruler of this little nation. He held the title as " Fürst zu Cammin" or " Prince of Kammin" in English. He held all the rights to govern and control it. The grand royal arms of Prussia carried its symbol and the Kings of Prussia claimed to be the dukes, princes and counts of this and many other realms in " full property and sovereignty." ( http://eurulers.angelfire.com) ( http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Titulatur_und
The following are just a few of the legal alienations, of whole and complete little European nations, that took place in the Congress or Treaty of Vienna in 1815:
ART. XV. His Majesty the King of Saxony renounces in perpetuity for himself and all his descendants and successors, in favour of his Majesty the King of Prussia, all his right and title to the provinces, districts, and territories, or parts of territories, of the kingdom of Saxony, hereafter named; and his Majesty the King of Prussia shall possess those countries in complete sovereignty and property, and shall unite them to his monarchy. (Thomas Curson Hansard, The parliamentary debates from the year 1803 to the present time, Volume 32, 1816, p. 79) 
Note that the territories are called "countries," because they were recognized as nation-states under the law.
ART. XVIII His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, wishing to give to the King of Prussia a fresh proof of his desire to remove every object of future discussion between their two courts, renounces for himself and his successors, his rights of sovereignty over the Margraviates of Upper and Lower Lusatia, which belonged to him as King, of Bohemia, as far as these rights concern the portion of these provinces placed under the dominion of his Majesty the King of Prussia, by virtue of the Treaty with his Majesty the King of Saxony, concluded at Vienna on, the 18th of May, 1813. (Ibid., p. 81)
Note that the King of Bohemia gave "his rights of sovereignty" over these little countries to the King of Prussia, who, by the way, he was not related to by blood.
ART. XXVII. His Majesty the King of Prussia cedes to his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, King of Hanover, to be possessed by his Majesty and his successors, in full property and sovereignty. . . . (Ibid., p. 86)
Note that the conveyance was "in full property and sovereignty." The were proprietary nations. The following is part of the Annex to the same Treaty in Act IV:
ART. II. His Majesty the King of Saxony renounces for ever, for himself, his heirs and successors, in favour of his Majesty the King of Prussia, all right and title to the provinces, districts, and portions of territory of the kingdom of Saxony, hereafter designated; and his Majesty the King of Prussia shall possess these countries in full sovereignty and property, and shall unite them to his monarchy. (Ibid., p. 141)
Note that the " designated" territories were again called " countries," that is, nation-states, and they were given " in full sovereignty and property." Only nation-states have full sovereignty. This kind of legal recognition is what is called treaty law, which is a part of international law. They were examples of whole nations that were conveyed to completely new monarchs. With this fact in mind, no wonder the great diplomat Prince Talleyrand named a number of these little principalities and duchies in his writings and lumped them together with kingdoms calling them " countries" and " states" and declared that they were " sovereign." (op.cit., Memoirs, pp. 161, 169)
Jean J. Burlamaqui (16941748), one of the founders of international law, explained that, " they [patrimonial kings and princes] are permitted to share, transfer, or alienate [their sovereignty] . . . [In other words, a] prince shall have full right [and prerogative] to dispose of the crown [his kingdom or principality], as he shall think proper." ( www.constitution.org/burla/burla_2107.htm) Alienation of this kind is highly unlikely in modern times, however, as Professor Stephen Kerr wrote, It is competent under the traditional doctrines of public international law to alienate Sovereignty by inter-vivos transfer. (See Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace (1625) Book II, Chapter VI,  Nos. 3 and 14; and Book I, Chapter III, No. 12) (See: Dynastic Law)
Because giving away a whole kingdom was the right of a true king, Henry IV of Germany (1050-1106) about 1080 AD before he became emperor, told some of the leading princes of the Holy Roman Empire, who he had wronged, that he ". . . would willingly cede his right of governance to them and dispose of his whole kingdom . . . ," the kingdom of Italy, if necessary to make it up. ( http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington
/ChurchHistory220/TopicFive/ChronicleHersfeld.html) However, he weaseled his way out of the agreement and held on to the kingdom for thirteen more years. The important point here is, that he could have ceded the whole kingdom, not whether he actually did it or not.
Ceding by treaties are often where kingdoms are conveyed from one sovereign to the new owner. Treaties are rich with examples of the alienation of kingdoms to new sovereigns. For example, in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the following took place:
His Catholic Majesty [the king of Spain] also agrees, in response to the petitions of Her Britannic Majesty to cede the Kingdom of Sicily to His Royal Highness Victor Amadeo the duke of Savoy, with Her Britannic Majesty promising that in the absence of male heirs of the house of Savoy she will take care to see that the kingdom returns to the crown of Spain, and Her Britannic Majesty also agrees that said kingdom may not be alienated, under any pretext or any other way, nor given to any other prince or state, but only to the Catholic king of Spain and to his heirs and successors. (Jon Cowans, editor, Early modern Spain: a documentary history, 2003, p. 208)
In 1718, Philip V, the King of Spain, by the Treaty of London ceded the Kingdom of Sardinia to Victor Amadeus II, duke of Savoy and King of Piedmont. He ceded the Kingdom of Sicily to Austria. ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Sardinia) Many more examples exist throughout the years. However, perhaps, one of the best examples of a whole nation-state being ceded took place on January 14, 1814, " By the Treaty of Kiel, peace with Denmark is [was] concluded. Danish King Frederik cedes [ceded] to the king of Sweden, and his successors, the kingdom of Norway." ( www.islandnet.com/~kpolsson/swedhis/swed1800.htm) Here is an example, of an alienation of a whole country. For a little background, the Kingdom of Norway first began in 817 A.D. and lasted for hundreds of years on and off sharing other kings but remaining a separate and distinct as a land and people. In 1397, the three kingdoms were united under one king for awhile as follows and then only the kingdoms of Denmark and Norway shared the same king:
The Kalmar Union (1397-1536)
The United Kingdoms of Denmark, Norway and Sweden (1397-1523)
The United Kingdoms of Denmark and Norway (1523-1536)
In 1814, Frederik VI, king of both Denmark and Norway, as the rightful king of Norway renounced his rights and ceded the whole kingdom of Norway forever to King Charles XIII of Sweden and his descendants. King Charles XIII of Sweden, then separately became King Charles II to the people of Norway. This was done by Treaty of Kiel or by international law. In other words, it really is true, as the Austrian Emperor Francis II testified, A prince can, if he wishes, cede . . . his country and all of his people [to another monarch or create a new nation-state]. (Guglielmo Ferrero, The Reconstruction of Europe: Talleyrand and the Congress of Vienna 1814-1815, 1941, p. 261)
The Kingdom of Sarawak was an independent kingdom, which had its beginning in 1842 when the Sultan of Brunei . . . ceded the complete sovereignty of Sarawak to [James] Brooke, who had saved his throne from rebellions. ( www.answers.com/topic/james-brooke) He became its first king and held the title of Raja [or king] of Sarawak. In 1888, the second white Raja accepted the British Empire as a military protectorate. ( http://en
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Sarawak) A protectorate, in international law, is autonomous territory that is protected diplomatically or militarily against third parties by a stronger state or entity. . . . ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protectorate) A protectorate remains a full and complete nation-state under international law, and it retains its sovereignty. . . . ( www.infoplease.com/ce6/society/A0840302.html) In the treaty creating this protectorate, it was understood the Sarawak was an " . . . independent state under the protection of Great Britain;" and " such protection shall confer no right on his Majesty's government to interfere with the internal administration of that state. . . ." ( www.1911encyclopedia.org/Protectorate) Legal experts ". . . affirmed the fact that Sarawak was indeed an independent sovereign state and that no case existed for interference in the internal administration of that country." ( www.angelfire.com/journal/brooke2000/AnthonyStory.html) The United States and Great Britain officially recognized the Kingdom of Sarawak as an authentic sovereign state.
Sarawak . . . grew into a genuine sovereign power over the region. ( http://coming
anarchy.com/2009/05/11/the-kingdom-of-sarawak-and-the-white-rajahs) The first white Raja . . . ruled as an absolute monarch with constitutional sympathies, perhaps akin in governance to the Tudor monarchy where a Parliament existed for advisory purposes only. (Ibid.) Sarawak was managed very well by its kings who were efficient and orderly. . . . The rubber and oil industries boomed. Public service institutions grew stronger, complete with a penal code modeled on the British penal code, while local traditions were preserved and Christian missionaries outlawed. In 1941, . . . a new constitution was adopted that turned the territory into a more genuine constitutional monarchy. (Ibid.)
Sarawak was not a fly by night kingdom. It was not just a kingdom for a day. It was a kingdom for over one hundred years.
After World War II, the third Brooke to rule Sarawak ceded the territory to the Colonial Office of the British Empire for a sizeable pension, paid to him and his three daughters. (Ibid.) In other words, he sold his kingdom to Great Britain. His actions were objected to by the Raja Muda, or Crown Prince Anthony Brooke, which objection legally thwarted the cession, but after years of fighting, he gave up and renounced his "de jure" rights in 1951, so the transfer became fully and completely legitimated at that time.
Because monarchs could cede, alienate or dismember parts of their nations, some countries put it into their most sacred laws that such would never be allowed or permitted. For example, " Ferdinand IV King of Naples and III, King of Sicily . . . from 8 Dec 1816 reigned as King Ferdinand I of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. By Art 165 (III), Constitution of 1820/21, the King 'cannot alienate, cede, or renounce in any way to any other person the Royal Authority' and could only 'abdicate the throne in favour of the person of his immediate successor'" ( www.chivalricorders.org/royalty/bourbon/twosicilies/bourbtsh.htm)
And last, by not least, one more transfer of all sovereignty " in totum." As reported in The New York Times for August 10, 1871: 
. . . Thokambau, the leading chief, was by a meeting of the citizens of Levuka, proclaimed constitutional king of the Fijis. . . . The fact of the establishment of a new constitutional Government in the world may now be considered accomplished, and the 'kingdom of Fiji' will henceforth rank among the powers of the earth. ( http://query.nytimes.com/mem
A new nation-state or kingdom emerged. The Kingdom of Fiji is on the List of Sovereign States of the world for 1871 and every year thereafter until the King with his advisors and fellow chiefs ceded the kingdom to Great Britain in 1974. ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
. . . He was recognised as king by the Western powers. In 1874, he was the lead signatory on the deed of cession which granted Britain sovereignty over the islands, and it was his efforts that brought Fiji under the guidance of the British Empire. After cession in 1874, all historical records refer to Seru Cakobau as only Vunivalu of Bau, or Ratu Seru Cakobau, indicating the title Tui Viti was lost when the sovereignty of Fiji was ceded to the British Crown. ( http://en.wikipedia.org
Interestingly, the Great Council of Chiefs still recognize Elizabeth II as "Tui Viti" or the traditional Queen of Fiji in spite of the fact that Fiji is now an independent republic since 1987.
 Both law and practice confirms the words of Hugo Grotius, one of the founding fathers of international law, that, A free people, or a king, may alienate their territory, in part or in full. ( On the Law of War and Peace, Book 2, ch. 6, no., sec. 7) In other words, A state may cede its own domain ["in totum"], in order to become a part of another state. . . . (George Grafton Wilson, Handbook of international law, 1910, p. 85) The " cession" may " . . . come as a result of war, or cession by gift, sale, exchange or other international act. The treaty of cession usually prescribes the conditions under which the transfer is made. . . ." (Ibid., p. 84)
None of the above is a surprise to people who know history. For example:
§ 10. There are numerous examples of such treaties of sale. In 1301, Theodoric, Landgrave of Thuringia, sold the Marquisate of Lusatia to Burchard, Archbishop of Magdeburg, for six hundred marks of silver, --- "insuper cum ministerialibus, Vasalis et Mancipiis, et aliis hominibus cujuscunque conditionis in jam dicta terra commorantibus," etc. In the same manner, in 1311, Dantzic, Derschovia and Swiecae, were sold by the Margrave of Brandenbourg to the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, for ten thousand marks. In 1333, the city and territory of Mechlin was transferred for one hundred thousand reals of gold, by a treaty of sale between its sovereign and the Earl of Flanders, the fealty being reserved. About the same time, the city and county of Lucques were sold by John of Luxemburg to Philip of Valois, for one hundred and eighty thousand florins; and a few years after, the sovereignty of Frankenstein was sold by the Duke of Silecia, for two thousand marks, to the king of Bohemia. The sovereignty which the Popes so long held over Avignon Avas purchased by Clement VI., for eighty thousand florins, from Jane, Queen of Naples and Countess of Provence. (Ward, Law of Nations, vol. 2, pp. 258-260; Dumont, Corps Lip., liv. 2, pp. 330, 364, 365; Dupuy, Droits de Boy F. C, p. 70; Leibnitz, Cod. Dip., p. 200; Biquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 2.)
§ 11. The practice also extended to the mortgaging of sovereignties, and the sales of reversionary interests in kingdoms. Thus, Robert, duke of Normandy, in order to raise money to engage in the first crusade, mortgaged his dutchy for six thousand six hundred and sixty-fix pounds weight of silver, to his brother William, and transferred the possession before his departure for the holy land. In 1479, Louis XL bought the right of the house of Penthievre, the next male heirs in reversion, to Britanny. And fifteen years later, Charles VIII. purchased, for an annual pension of four thousand three hundred ducats, an estate of five thousand, in lands in France or Italy, and the disposition of the Morea (when conquered,) of Paleologus, the nephew of Constantine, the last Christian emperor, his right to the whole empire of Constantinople. The act of sale being drawn up by two notaries, and ratified, Charles assumed the robes and ornaments of the imperial dignity, and made no scruples in claiming the imperial rights vested in him by virtue of this purchase. (Ward, Law ef Nations, vol. 2, pp. 260-262 ; Garnicr, Hist, de France, liv. 1, pp. 429, 461, 494; Russell, Hist Modern Europe, vol. 1, pp. 185, 472; White, Hist. of France, p. 208.)
§ 12. It was also the custom to dispose of sovereignties and dominions by deeds of gift, and by bequests. The emperor Lewis V., created the dauphin Humbert king, with the full privilege of disposing of his sovereignty at will, during life, or at his death. In 1343, Humbert ceded his dominions to Philip of Valois, by solemn deed of gift. By similar deeds, and upon a like principle, the emperor Henry VI. conferred upon Richard I, the kingdom of Aries, and the emperor Baldwin gave to the duke of Burgundy the kingdom of Thessalonia. By bequests, not only were whole sovereignties disposed of, but the orders of succession were frequently changed. Thus, Charles H., king of Sicily and count of Provence, changed by will the order of succession to the county, and the claims of Charles VHI to the throne of Naples were founded upon the adoption of Louis of Anjou, by Jane, queen of Naples, in 1380, which was evidenced to all Europe by a solemn and public deed. (Ward, Law of Nations, vol. 2, pp. 262-264; Leibnitz, Cod. Dip., pp. 51, 237, 158, 220, 382; Pfelfel, Droit Pub. d'AUemagne, tome 1, p. 541; Henault, Hist. Chron, tome 1, p. 315; Dumont, Corps Dip., tome 1, pp. 288, 337, 362.) (Henry Wager Halleck, International law: Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War, 1861, pp. 128-130)
In other words:
§ 7. A state may acquire property or domain in various ways ; its title may be acquired originally by mere occupancy, and confirmed by the presumption arising from the lapse of time; or by discovery and lawful possession; or by conquest, confirmed by treaty or tacit consent; or by grant, cession, purchase, or exchange; in fine, by any of the recognized modes by which private property is acquired by individuals. . . . (Wheaton, Mem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 4, §§ 1, 4, 5 ; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 221-277 ; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 2, cap. 4; Vattd, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, chs. 7 and 11; Rutherforth, Institutes, b. 1, ch. 3; b. 2, ch. 9; Puffendorf, de Jur. Nat. et Gent., lib. 4, chs. 4, 5, 6; Moser, Versuch, etc., b. 5, cap. 9; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 35, et seq.; Schmaltz, Droit des Gens, liv. 4, ch. 1; Kluber, Droit des Gens, §§ 125, 126; Heffter, Droit International, § 76; Ortolan Domaine International, §§ 53, et seq.; Bowyer, Universal Public Law, ch. 28; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 4; Biquelme, Derecho, Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 2; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 3, ch. 5.) (Ibid., pp. 126-127)
(12) But I thought sovereignty was inalienable?
Is not the principle of inalienability itself a limitation on sovereignty [sovereignty being supreme and ultimate authority above all others]? Surely a sovereign who cannot alienate his sovereignty has his freedom of action [his highest of all powers] limited by that very fact? (Ali A. Mazrui, " Alienable Sovereignty in Rousseau: A Further Look," Ethics, vol. 77, no. 2, January 1967, p. 108)
A deeper understanding of sovereignty makes it clear that:
1. indivisible means it cannot be divided unless those in supreme power and authority, which is above all authority, freely and willingly without any coercion permit it to be segmented or partitioned;
2. inalienable means it cannot be alienate without the full and absolute consent of those who own all the rights to that sovereign power and influence, which is above all authority in the territory; and
3. indefeasible means that the greatest power and honor of the nation cannot be annulled or made void by any outside authority of itself. But it can make up its own mind, with the supreme-supernal power it possesses to do whatever it wants to.
In other words, sovereignty can be divided, it can be alienated and it can be transferred and sold, if those, who hold this supreme right to control things, decide to do so.
Because sovereignty means that no outside force has a right to interfere, then, these inherent rights become inalienable, immutable, incorruptible and inviolable. But what this really means is:
. . . that they may not be alienated from the person who possesses them, i.e., they may not be given or taken away [without his or her consent], i.e., they may not be morally infringed upon [by any outside force]. . . . For example, a man may violate your right to your property by taking it away from you, but your right to that property has not been alienated [you still hold the right], i.e., you are in the right and the robber is in the wrong. ( http://www.capitalism.org/faq/rights.htm)
It needs to be remembers that monarchs own their right to rule. It is their property. Johann Wolfgang Textor (1749-1832), the famous German publicist and International lawyer, wrote, " . . . In an elective kingdom . . . the royal right is essentially the same, and therefore, an elective King is a true owner of his kingdom just as the King of a . . . [hereditary] non-patrimonial kingdom is." ( Synopsis of the Law of Nations, ch. XX, no. 24, 1680) And " . . . a non-patrimonial kingdom . . . is . . . in the position of the possessor [owner] of a majorit [which is a right to property by a title of honor, such as being king or prince]." (Ibid.) In other words, " . . . the possessor of a majorit is during his life is a true owner, and not merely a usufructuary [one that used someone else's property]. . . ." (Ibid.) So, " Sovereignty is a property which is absolute and indivisible . . . which belongs to the Sovereign. . . ." (Jacques Maritain, " The Concept of Sovereignty," The American Political Science Review, vol. 44, no. 2, June 1950, p. 349) No matter what kind of king or sovereign prince, sovereignty, once given, is owned. But above all others, in a true patrimonial kingdom, the monarch not only owns the right to rule or possesses full sovereignty, but he owns all the land as well. This is perhaps the highest type of king or sovereign monarch on earth. He truly personifies and embodies the nation-state in full property and sovereignty. Therefore, " Where the sovereignty is a full property right, it includes ownership of the land and the people, and the right to dispose of all at pleasure." (Charles Edward Merriam, History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau, 1900, p. 377) But for anyone who holds hereditary sovereignty, they ". . . had a right to supreme power which was natural and inalienable, inalienable to such a degree that dethroned [deposed] kings and their descendants kept this right forever. . . ." (Ibid., pp. 343-357)
Professor Textor rhetorically asked the question: " Whether a King can or can not alienate [sell or give away] his sovereignty [his royal rights] without his people's consent." He  then explained, " Grotius says that he can in a patrimonial kingdom, because it is within the King's absolute discretion, but that he can not in a limited monarchy." ( De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, Book II, chapter 6, no. 3+) In other words, a regnant patrimonial King or Prince can do so because " . . . he has full dominion and power of disposition" as the owner of all the land as well as being the Lord and reigning Monarch. (Ibid., p. 318)
This absolute power is similar to what a " de jure" non-reigning king or prince can do, which is the right to sell the " de jure" rights to one of his many little nation-states or even sell all the sovereign rights to his kingdom or even an empire. This was done by Andreas Palaiologos. " Andreas (Andrew) . . . was the only legitimate representative of the dynasty of the Palaeologi, who possessed the rights to the lost Byzantine throne." (A. A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, 324-1453, Vol. 2, 1952, p. 590) This man was the " de jure" or rightful non-reigning successor to the Byzantine Empire. He legitimately sold all his " de jure" royal and imperial rights, titles and prerogatives, " which were genuine," to Charles VIII, the King of France, in 1494. (See the subchapters: " Ownership and Property Rights" and " The King and the Constitution as well as How Sovereignty can be Permanently Lost" in the article " Sovereignty & The Future of Nobility and Royalty") " Foncomagne has published the original draft of this act of cession which is in the Library of Paris. See Mem. de l'Acad. d. Inscript., XVII., 539-78 (Paris, 1751); DELAbOrDE, 405, gives a portrait of Charles, adorned with Imperial Insignia, out of the Coll. Gaignieres d. Bibl. Nat. t BUrCharDI Diarium, II., 226 seq.; Sanudo, Spediz., 192" (Dr. Ludwig Pastor, The History of the Popes: from the close of the Middle Ages, vol. 5, 1902, p. 461) Of course, this could not be done in our day and age, but back in those days, as Johann Wolfgang Textor testified, a " . . . [patrimonial] King can dispose of his Kingdom [the whole kingdom] and any part of it, in his own right. . . ." (Ibid., p. 81) So also can a " de jure" nonreigning monarch cede his or her royal and/or imperial rights. (See " Question 12")
There is another factor that must be considered in any alienation. A lawful heir can rightfully stop an alienation or cession from happening as he has a powerful birthright to rule after his father, However, if he consents, is acquiescence or silent, when he could and should have spoken up and protested, estoppel kicks in, then it is presumed that the right is abandoned on a permanent irretrievable basis. At this point, nothing can be done to reclaim it. It is lost. (See " Abdications, Renunciations and Annexations" in the article " Sovereignty & The Future of Nobility and Royalty")
 But every land, title and sovereign realm is " inalienable," or impossible to divide, unless the reigning monarch, or in the case of a disposed " de jure" prince, this person willingly consents or decides to alienate it. The key here is one must give his willing consent, otherwise, such an alienation is impossible. Jean J. Burlamaqui explained that " the princes of the blood royal [in a hereditary realm] . . . certainly [have] an absolute and irrevocable [sovereign] right, of which they cannot be stripped without their consent." ( www.constitution.org/burla
/burla_2204.htm) No one can lawfully " . . . acquire another man's property [or his royal rights and privileges] without his consent, for to deprive another against his will . . . runs counter to all Law. (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, 1680, p. 72) Prince Talleyrand wrote, " . . . A cession or renunciation is null, if it has not been freely made. . . ." (op.cit., Memoirs, p. 160) Hence, it is that sovereignty is inalienable unless the reigning king, or sovereign prince, or a rightful successor, willingly consents to an abdication, renounces the throne, cedes it or loses it by acquiescence, implied waiver, or estoppel, which in international law is a close cousin of acquiescence and prescription.
 Jean Bodin (15301596), a renown French jurist and philosopher, declared that the French kings " . . . on their accession to the throne they took an oath never to alienate the domain." ( Six Books of the Commonwealth, Book VI, ch. 2) Such an oath would not be necessary if it was not widely known and a common practice in medieval times that alienation, etc. was possible for a whole entire kingdom or principality, because such was done. Bodin explained, " This is not a rule peculiar to this kingdom [meaning France alone], but is a custom binding on the Kings of Spain, Poland, and England, for they also are required to take an oath against alienating the domain." (Ibid.) The point is, whole nation-states were, in fact, alienated, willed, discarded, sold and lost by the various means already explained, such as, those little " countries" that were ceded by the Treaty of Vienna.
However, there is another international legal term called " laches," which also impacts on either the loss or maintenance of " de jure" royal and imperial rights. " Laches is derived from the French 'lecher' and is nearly synonymous with negligence." ( www.lectlaw.com/def/l056.htm) It is used, " In addition, or as an alternative, to the principle of acquiescence, international tribunals have applied the doctrines of extinctive prescription and laches to bar a claim on the basis of undue delay." (Andrew Newcombe & Lluís Paradell, Law and practice of investment treaties: standards of treatment , 2009, p. 525) " Undue delay" means a failure to make the proper protest to keep " de jure" rights alive, safe and faraway from the potential of permanent loss. Latches is similar to " statues of limitations" only it is not statutory, but part of equity law. It comes from the Latin expression vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit, which means " equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights." In other words, neglect to assert a claim makes one vulnerable to its loss. As in other principles of the transfer of sovereign rights from one state or sovereign to another, a defense from such can be insanity, infancy, undue influence, duress or a substantial threat to life, limb, family or financial ruin or disaster.
(13) Yes, it is obvious sovereignty can be sold, at least in ancient times, but can a "de jure" sovereign sell his sovereignty? I believe the only example of such is Andreas Palaiologos, who sold all his "de jure" imperial rights to the Byzantine Empire to the King of France.
Note the following analogy and the conclusions of Dr. Stephen Kerr wrote:
Kept alive by diplomatic protests [according to the principles of prescription] made by King Francis II and the Count of Caserta, their claim . . . may be analogized [compared] . . . to the claim of the owner of a stolen automobile who has kept his claim of de jure ownership of that car 'alive' by filing a report with the competent police authorities: See Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. I, "Governments-in-Exile," pp. 921-930; F. E. Oppenheim, "Governments and Authorities in Exile," 36 American Journal of International Law (1942), pp. 568-595; and Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. I, No. 144.
That owner may not be in de facto possession of that automobile, but having filed the claim with the police he remains the de jure owner of that car. This 'claim' to the stolen automobile is not the mere 'expectation of a right.' Rather this 'claim' possesses real substance in the ownership of that stolen car --- given the filing of the necessary report with the police to keep that claim alive. Because this 'claim' to the stolen automobile has real substance in the basis of the police report asserting ownership to the car, this 'claim' can be sold or disposed of i.e., to an insurance company) as can any other 'claim'. For example, insurance companies will frequently pay off the claim of an owner of a stolen car and then assert ownership to the car once it has been recovered.
If the owner fails to make any claim whatsoever on the stolen car or any official complaint about it, the car's ownership can be legally transferred to the thief, the usurper, with the passing of time wherein a new title can be applied for. This also happens with sovereignty.
. . . Competent protests [under the principles of "prescription" are] not a mere "expectation of a right" but [are] a definite claim of real, concrete substance under public international law. As an international claim of real substance . . . the claim of the Bourbons of Naples to the Two Sicilies . . . is as renounceable and disposable as is any other claim under international public law. States frequently settle differences by renouncing various international claims against each other: See Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. I, Nos. 486 and 488. (" Interim up-date of Professor Kerr's 1973 Research --- Part 2:" http://web
Yes, "de jure" sovereignty is "renounceable and disposable." A true "de jure" sovereign, as a king, or sovereign prince, is theoretically totally free from all power outside himself and holding the supreme, ultimate power that cannot be interfered with, that is, such a ruler can sell, renounce, abandon, will, transfer or cede all he possesses to someone else. Prince Antony Brooke, the "de jure" king of Sarawak, renounced all rights to the kingdom in 1951, thus legitimizing his uncle's cession of the kingdom to Great Britain years earlier.
 Andreas Palaiologos' sale of all his " de jure" imperial, royal and sovereign rights and titles to the King of France, Charles VIII in 1494 was an authentic and genuine conveyance. Two kings later, under Francis I, it was still being claimed that the kings of France were the emperors of Constantinople. Not until Charles IX, did the claim come to an end as a result of disinterest. (David Potter, A History of France, 1460-1560: The Emergence of a Nation State, p. 33) This disinterest was the equivalent of an abandonment.
Professor Noel Cox explained that, " . . . Time . . . erodes the de jure authority of an exile . . . through desuetude." (Letter of January 21, 2010) That is, if the " de jure" sovereign does nothing, which is " desuetude" --- doesn't even use his titles, it is like the man who fails to report his stolen car, which protest must be renewed with each new successor. If this claim does not take place, the car, the Imperial rights, can then become the legal, even rightful, property of the usurper --- the Ottoman Empire in this case, or the car thief in the analogy. To keep the precious gift, rights, privileges, crowns, and honors of sovereignty, protests must be made. Titles must be used. Interest and desire must continue in every generation. (See " Question 5")
(14) What about Ecclesiastical sovereignty?
The sovereignty relevant to nobility and royalty, by definition, is exclusive to government or political power or " de jure" rights over a land or territory. Religious leaders do not rule over  countries or nations. Their domain is religious and has nothing whatsoever to do with secular dominion. This is self-evident and obvious especially when it is considered that, " Sovereignty is the exclusive right to exercise, within a specific territory, the functions of a Nation-state and be answerable to no higher authority." ( www.docstoc.com/docs/6414333
/National_sovereignty) In fact, " Everything and everybody, including the clergy, was subordinate to it." ((Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: evolution of an idea, 2007, p. 65)
Christian theology recognizes a division between government sovereignty and religious rights. Over every nation he [God] set a ruler --- a sovereign --- a secular ruler. (Ecclesiastics 17:14) That is, By me [by the power and authority of God] kings reign, and princes decree justice. By me [that is, by God] princes rule, and nobles, even all the judges of the earth. (Proverbs 8:15-16) These kings, princes and nobles had sovereignty and it was given them by God. The people, including the religious leaders, were subordinate to them in government rule. This division is important to remember in regard to religious claims to the right of sovereignty, because sovereignty, by definition and meaning, is the domain of the political or secular authorities, not the domain of ecclesiastical authorities, whose domain does not involve sovereignty. For example in the days of the Kings of Israel, there was a king, who ruled, fought and lead the military; and a separate man, the high priest and/or prophets, who was the religious leaders, who were uninvolved with war and had nothing to do with the warriors or what some  would call " knights" --- David's special legendary elite, the " Thirty" or " the mighty ones." (1 Chronicles 11) That is, there was a division between sovereignty and religious leadership. Centuries later this division was still in force and it continues to this day. No wonder, the disciples of the Christ were taught to " Render . . . unto Caesar, the things which are Caesar's [that is, honor his right to rule] and [render] to God the things that are God's [the importance of living a good life]." (Matthew 22:21)
Church leaders were told that both they and the people should submit themselves to the king, as supreme . . . , that is, the one who is foremost and highest in rank politically. Therefore, Peter admonished his followers to Honour [that is, obey, give deference to] the [secular] king --- he who held the right to rule and govern, which is sovereignty. (1 Peter 2:13,17) " For there is no power but of God: the powers that be [the kings and princes of the earth] are ordained of God." (Romans 13:1) Therefore, the apostle Paul also wrote, " Put them in mind to be subject to principalities [the sovereign rulers of these territories] and powers, to obey magistrates, to be ready to every good work." (Titus 3:1) (See: " Monarchy and Nobility: Divine Rights & Responsibilities") The obvious conclusion, which is only common sense, is that there is a separate between church and state and " sovereignty . . . [is] a purely secular form of authority. . . ," not religious. (Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p. 62)
On the legal side of things, Noel Cox, LLB, LLM, Ph.D. professor of Constitutional Law, Auckland University of Technology and an expert jurist in this field, declared, Supranational [international] organizations, unless [they] themselves [are] recognised as sovereign, cannot create Orders of Chivalry. He also said, . . . knighthood, as traditionally understood, can only be conferred by a Sovereign. Hence, Orders of Chivalry . . . [must be] under the protection of Chiefs or of Houses of recognised sovereign rank. The conclusion is that, Only de jure [legal] sovereigns . . . may create Orders of Chivalry. Descendants who do not hold de jure sovereignty, have permanently lost the right to rule, and religious leaders cannot create a genuine Orders of Chivalry. (See: The sovereign authority for the creation of Orders of Chivalry www.geocities.com/noelcox/Creation.htm)
Professor Stephen Kerr concurred. He wrote:
To be legitimate, an order of chivalry must have a fons honorum: A sovereign house, a State, or other international person [who has the supreme right to rule politically or governmentally --- not a religious leader]. Without such a sovereign fons honorum, the legitimacy of an order of chivalry lapses [that is, ends or terminates]. (See: " Dynastic Law")
Likewise, Guy Stair Sainty, a well-known expert in orders of chivalry, explained:
The Patriarchs [religious leaders] are not Sovereigns, or even claimants to Sovereignty, and therefore lack the authority to found or give their protection to Orders of Chivalry. . . . ( http://stichtingargus.nl
(15) But what about the Pope?
The Pope is a recognized elective sovereign prince of a real independent country. It is probably the smallest nation on earth --- the Vatican. Prior to this, the Popes had sovereign territories and armies in Medieval times, and later after their loss were "de jure" sovereigns. Finally after the Lateran Treaty in 1929, they again had a real territory to rule over. All the orders of chivalry under the Pope are genuine and authentic because of this sovereignty. No other religious leaders on earth holds this secular right, which is the highest governmental honor one can receive on earth. The Pope is the only one who is a both a religious leader and a recognized monarch or sovereign prince over a little nation.
(16) Dynastic sovereignty is different from regular sovereignty or the sovereignty of today. So when you compare modern sovereignty with the sovereignty of monarchs, you are comparing apples with oranges.
Sovereignty is an extremely important concept. No wonder it has been described as " the defining doctrine," " the primary cause" from which flows all effective government, " the defining feature of statehood," " the glue or cement that holds all society together," " the one and only true stabilizing principle," " bedrock," " the foundation stone," " the most sacred of international law principles," " an indispensable concept," " of cardinal importance," " the central organizing principle," " the soul" of civilized society, " the reference point," " the central concept for the preservation of world peace," " the most basic principle in international affairs," " the dominant world order framework," doubtlessly " the most precious" of all governmental rights, " the cornerstone," " the guiding principle," " the key constitutional safeguard," " the final and ultimate matrix of a stable society," the " pinnacle," the " ark of the covenant," the " holy grail," the " Alpha and Omega," the " first principle," "the " sine qua non of international law," that is, the indispensable condition that cannot be done without, for it is " the building block," " the principle of solidarity" --- " safeguarding humanity." Everything of real importance in government revolves around this chief governing principle. (See: " Sovereignty & The Future of Nobility and Royalty")
We use Westphalian sovereignty, because it is the sovereignty created by the Emperor, Kings  and Princes of the Holy Roman Empire including the Kings of Sweden, Denmark and others. And it is the same sovereignty used today. As Professor Philip M. Nichols, Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, taught, This principle [of Westphalian sovereignty] retains its vitality in international tribunals to this day. (Integrated Sovereignty, 2008 Seminar Lecture: http://works.bepress
Black's Law Dictionary describes sovereignty as:
. . . Supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power . . . , supreme political authority; the supreme will; . . . the self-sufficient source of political power from which all specific political powers are derived; . . . the power of regulating . . . internal affairs without foreign dictation . . . . (1430 (8th ed. 2004) 
This is the definition we use as well. It is the same as the Westphalian Treaty described. And as Professor Nichols explained, Local courts throughout the world [in modern times continue to] use the definition found in Blacks, or a similar absolutist definition [which is basically the same. (Ibid.) But no matter how important this principle is and the fact that modern courts use it, a number of scholars love to use it as their favorite punching bag. (Ibid.) They love to use the extreme definition of it and say it isn't realistic and doesn't take place in real life anywhere on earth. This has always been amazing since it is such a well-known fact that, . . . in the world no entity [no country, nation or kingdom] possesses absolute control over everything, nor should it. (Ibid.) In other words, . . . there has never been a mythical past in which states could exercise absolute control and authority. (Katherine L. Lynch, The forces of economic globalization: challenges to the regime of International Commercial Arbitration, 2006, pp. p. 52-53) Sovereignty has always been limited in some way or another. It is an " . . . extremely relevant fact that sovereigns need not have supreme authority over all matters within a territory. . . . [In fact] in practice, modern sovereigns have never had total license or absolute authority over everything." (Jack Donnelly, "State Sovereignty and Human Rights:" http://mysite.du.edu/~jdonnell/papers/hrsov%20v4a.htm) According to Grotius:
The supreme power is . . . limited by divine law, natural law and the law of nations, but also by such agreements as are made between ruler and ruled. Thus an indefinite number of rights may be subtracted from the authority of the ruler; his acts may be rendered subject to ratification by a senate or other body . . . yet the sovereignty still retains its essential quality unimpaired. (Charles Edward Merriam, History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau, 1900, pp. 375-376)
When the chips are down and an emergency appears, full sovereignty is there to employ as is needed and necessary. Otherwise its enormous power remains reatively invisible and unseen. People get confused when they forget that sovereignty is a "right," practiced in different ways. It is not to be "confused with [absolute] control over [all] outcomes. . . . Sovereignty is the right, not the ability, to determine one's policies.
[In other words,] like any right it may or may not be effectively enjoyed [it might be] infringed, violated, or ignored." (op.cit., Jack Donnelly) Soverignty is an abstract right, not a concrete fact. But it still has full power, when needed.
The point here is, sovereignty is always there behind the seens, it is intact, it is flexible, bendable and adaptable, but it is still absolute even though it is dormant and used in a divided fashion most of the time. So, while this notion of [absolute] sovereignty has provoked criticism [because it is misunderstood], it [the concept of sovereignty] retains vitality in international use, and remains the cornerstone [or the fundamental and most seminal principle] of international law. (op.cit., Nickols) It is indispensable to the nations and society, not only back then, but now.
The right or privilege of Westphalian sovereignty is the most powerful of all political concepts and it is . . . is built upon an absolutist concept of sovereignty, in ancient as well as modern times. (Ibid.) . . . Sovereignty [Westphalian sovereignty] . . . dominates international law. (Ibid.) It has for hundreds of years. In our day and age, Courts [both local and international] continue to use the absolutist definition. . . . (Ibid.) . . . The absolutists conception of sovereignty dominates scholarly discourse as well. (Ibid.) Because, no matter how it is criticized, no one can get away from the fundamental soundness of sovereignty in the world. (Ibid.) Sovereignty is a robust concept that has withstood the test of time. It is the same sovereignty that was known to the kings and princes of old. It is the same today. There is no difference in the basic fundamental concept. (See: " Sovereignty in the Holy Roman Empire")
(17) Sovereignty is accused of having many definitions and has been argued over for hundreds of years. Hasn't sovereignty changed or been modified?
The short answer is no. Throughout all history " . . . the basic elements [of sovereignty] remain constant. . . . Those premises have remained unchanged [consistent and stable] down to the present day." (op.cit., Jeremy Rabkin, p. 22) That is, " What is stable and continuous over the entire history of sovereignty is the idea that a sovereign government is an authority that is supreme over all other authorities in the same territorial jurisdiction, and is independent of all foreign authorities." (Ibid., p. 23) Sovereignty " . . . retains vitality in international use, and remains the cornerstone [or rock solid fundamental concept] of international law." (Philip M. Nichols, Integrated Sovereignty, 2008 Seminar Lecture: http://works.bepress
 Sovereignty is important. It has had important consequences for millions in the past and now billions of ordinary people in the present and in the future. It has to be jealously guarded, yet it is persistently attacked by political actors, who are not sovereign, but want to be. This includes revolutionaries, globalists, nationalists, populists, European Unionists and secessionists among others. Those who say " Westphalian sovereignty is a myth" or hypocrisy fail to see clearly the reality that sovereignty is " no more a myth than the ideas of the rule of law, the social contract, democracy, [etc.]. [But sovereignty like other abstract concepts] has been a key [or a bedrock] ingredient in the foundation . . . of the modern system of rule." (Giovanni Arrighi, " Globalization, State Sovereignty, and the 'Endless' Accumulation of Capital," 1977: http://fbc.binghampton.edu/gairvn97.htm) Even:
The reshaping of sovereignty by human rights has left states today no less sovereign than they were fifty, a hundred, or three hundred and fifty years ago. Contemporary human rights constraints on the freedom of action of states are completely compatible with "full" "Westphalian" sovereignty. Rather than 1948 [the Universal Declaration of Human Rights] challenging, let alone triumphing over, 1648 [the Peace of Westphalia], the society of states has made space for human rights within the practices of state sovereignty." (op.cit., Jack Donnelly)
"At the core [the center or hub of the word sovereignty] . . . is the idea of supreme authority." (Ibid.) Robert Jackson, professor of International Relations and Political Science at Boston University, explains:
A sovereign state can be defined as an authority that is supreme in relation to all other authorities in the same territorial jurisdiction, and that is independent of all foreign [or outside] authorities. . . .
That definition can apply to a republic just as readily as a monarchy. . . .
There are not different kinds of sovereignty. A sovereign state is not a particular form of constitution, such as a monarchy or republic or democracy. Nor is it a particular style of governance. Sovereignty is a political and legal foundation upon which various sorts of state[s] . . . can be erected, and styles of government carried on. If states are sovereign, their ruling authority will have the same basic characteristics of supremacy and independency no matter how they are otherwise constitution or governed. (Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 1988, pp. 10-11)
"Sovereignty, though its meanings have varied across history . . . has a core [or essential] meaning, supreme authority within a territory. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, revised 2009: http://plato.stanford.edu
/entries/sovereignty) Scholars, and others with hidden agendas, have attacked it and used it as a punching back, but it is robust and flexible and has survived with its core intact. (See: Question #15)
With this power, "A sovereign state can make a treaty. It can also break a treaty, or determine for itself when a treaty commitment is no longer binding or applicable." (Jeremy Rabkin, "Recalling the Case for Sovereignty" Chicago Journal of International Law, January 1 2005, p. 23) ". . . Sovereigns have no superior. They answer to no one. . . ." (op.cit., Jackson, pp. 16-17) But there is a difference between the raw absolute power of sovereignty itself and legal right to use it. Internal domestic law creates checks and balances to ensure it is used for the common good of everyone. In other words, that great power may be delegated or assigned out in a document of supreme law, such as, a constitution.
Focusing on the sovereignty of reigning kings or ruling princes, " As a monarch is the source of the Sovereign Power of the state and the grantor of any constitution, he is not deprived of the power conferred upon him by his kingship merely because he has promised to exercise it in a certain way. . . ." (Stephen Kerr, The Augustan XVIII:4, p. 130) In such a situation, the regnant king's powers are exercised by ministers, judges and other officials. But the king or sovereign prince remains the supreme power, holding all rights and powers in his person.
A "de jure" or deposed monarch is in a different position entirely --- being independent of a constitution and government restraints, such a king or prince ". . . exercises the full plentitude [or fullness] of Sovereign Power, executive, legislative, and judicial," because such:
. . . possesses[,] under the applicable doctrines of public international law[,] the implied constitutional power to perform all normal acts of state, including those acts of state which would required the consent of an organ of government, such as a parliament, which is unavoidably suspended due to the exile condition. (Ibid. & " A Discussion by Prof. Kerr of the Original 1973 Analysis of the Disputed Bourbon-Two Sicilies Succession under the Doctrines of Public International Law:" http://web.archive.org/web/20050208083648/dynastic-law.com/1973b.html)
This exercise is limited by the country in which he lives. That is, a " de jure" sovereign or government in exile must obey the domestic laws of the host country in which he or the government in exile dwells. Nevertheless, his sovereignty is supreme, valid and authentic. Thus, he can rightfully use the exalted titles he holds because he is a royal or sovereign personage with all the rights, honors, privileges and majesty that goes with it. (For more information on this, please see " The King and the Constitution as well as How Sovereignty can be Permanently Lost" in the article " Sovereignty & The Future of Nobility and Royalty")
 This kind of sovereignty is " de jure" and it can last forever as long as the titles and arms must be used as the minimum protest. (See answers to questions 3, 4, 5 & 7 on this page) As Professor Kerr declared:
The de jure sovereignty of a state which has been usurped by a foreign conqueror is not extinguished by such usurpation but survives as long as such sovereignty is kept alive by competent diplomatic protests. (See Philip Marshall Brown, "Sovereignty in Exile," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 35,1941, p. 666-668)
We are grateful that most European "de jure" sovereigns continue to use their titles and their ancestors never failed to follow what preserves and safeguards those sacred rights. Thus the future of nobility and royalty is still strong as most known royals continue to be authentic, genuine, legitimate, valid, rightful, real and true. Thus, the future is bright for the survival of "de jure" or deposed kings, princes and their successors, even if "de jure" recognition is only in "breach" or in an inactive or dormant form of international law.
(18) What is dynastic law and sovereignty?
Dynastic sovereignty is nothing more or less than the supreme power being vested in the king or sovereign prince and his successors. It is the personification and embodiment of all the power, majesty and glory of the nation and is an " . . . inalienable right of sovereignty, . . . which can be lost only by voluntary [willing or implied] renunciation (transfer) or [the] extinction of the dynasty [or royal family itself]." (Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law, 1998, p. 54) This is " de jure internal sovereignty," and it can last forever and never end or it can be irretrievably and permanently lost. Much of the above " questions and answers" directly support and relate to it. It describes the sovereign rights of both reigning and deposed monarchs and their successors. For more on this special quality, see the articles: " Dynastic Law," " Sovereignty & The Future of Nobility and Royalty," and " Sovereignty in the Holy Roman Empire."
Dynastic law, on the other hand, is the personal and private rules of a royal house that govern eligibility to a throne as well as determining membership and the entitlement to honors, ranks, titles and styles. It may be codified and be part of a constitution or statute or it may merely be an oral tradition. Both reigning and " de jure" royal houses have basic house rules that may change as decided upon by the Chief of House and Arms. 
If you have a question on sovereignty, please feel free to inquire!
We encourage you to read and enjoy the articles that follow, which are informative and can deepen one's understanding of the whys and wherefores as well as the true and permanent rights of royalty, nobility and chivalry. The following articles are considered to be especially important and valuable:
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